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FOREWARD 
The Agricultural industry in the United States has undergone substantial change 
over the past four decades. As a producer of a basic commodity, food, it has been called 
upon to rapidly increase or decrease its level of activity in response to changing domestic 
and world food needs. The changes have been complicated by a longer-term change in the 
technological means by which total output is produced. These technological changes have 
resulted in a sharp substitution of capital in the form of machines and other inputs for 
manhours of labor, both from farm operators and hired labor, and land. The resulting 
migration of labor from agriculture has added to the burden of urban problems-
employment, housing and public services-just to mention a few. The resulting increase in 
effective land supply has greatly increased the national capacity for food production. 
The changes occuring in agriculture are not over, however. The industry remains 
in a state of imbalance with total output often exceeding quantitites demanded at home and 
abroad at prices acceptable to farmers. Also there is considerable evidence to suggest that 
the quantity of resources used in producing the level of output is greater than necessary. 
Both aspects suggest that considerable resource adjustment lies ahead for the industry. 
To ease the burden of adjustment, government programs have long affected the 
rates of change and level of output in agriculture. It is likely that programs will need to 
continue for the forseeable future. But there is the possibility that some change in programs 
could bring about a more efficient allocation and use of government resources, a better 
solution of problems and costs falling on many families and sectors of the rural community 
and improves long-run solutions to the capacity problem. These possibilities provide the 
basis for the explorations of this particular study. 
In the course of the study, certain persons have contributed greatly in the 
gathering and availability of data. In particular, Roger K. Eyvindson of the Iowa State 
University staff shared a considerable amount of data on machinery costs per acre for seven 
major crops in over 150 regions of the United States. Also, members of the United States 
Department of Agriculture have been extremly helpful in supplying data on production 
costs. These persons include Glen Barton, Neil Schaller, Fred Abel, Jerry Sharples, W. Herb 
Brown, Tom Miller, Gaylord Worden, P. Leo Strickland Jr., Wilmoth C. McArthur, Walter 
W. Pawson, Glenn A. Zepp and LeRoy C. Rude. In addition Austin S. Fox was helpful in 
supplying data on pesticide use. We appreciate the cooperation exhibited in making available 
a large amount of basic data on the great expanse of agriculture in the United States. 
L.V.M. 
E.O.H. 
H.C.M. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study focuses on the farm problems generated in a nation at an advanced 
stage of economic growth and urbanization, and the role of agricultural policy within this 
framework. It outlines the types and consequences of problems that arise for various groups 
in farming and the mral community as a result of rapid advances in capital technology and 
production capacity for agriculture. It reviews alternatives in policy to meet the farm 
stmctural transformation of the decade ahead. Finally it analyzes the outcomes for four 
specific farm policy alternatives which might be extended into the 1970's. Acreages, prices, 
incomes and other relevant quantities are computed for these four alternatives as they relate 
to the wheat, feed grain and livestock sectors. 
Major conclusions drawn from the study are: 
1. The agricultural sector in the United States now operates in an advanced 
industrial economy in which growth in farm output is a function of inputs added 
to land; these inputs serve as substitutes for this resource. The total productive 
capacity of the nation's agriculture is increasing rapidly through this course. 
Controlling this capacity through restraints on land will grow in difficulty and 
cost. 
2. The increased use of commercially-produced inputs or capital technologies will 
continue to raise per acre yields at rates which may necessitate further reductions 
in major crop acreages by 1970, even though both domestic and export demand 
levels increase. 
3. There are approximately 50 million acres of cropland which have now been idled 
from crop production for almost a decade and are unlikely to be required for crop 
production in the foreseeable future. Increase in per acre yields may raise this 
number to 60 million acres by 1975 or sooner. 
4. Government costs for retiring land under present programs will continue to rise as 
(a) total acres retired increase to control aggregate production, and (b) yields per 
acre rise and increase the opportunity cost of land retirement. 
5. Long term land retirement presents a policy alternative capable of reducing by 
one-half the total cost of government supply control programs and at the same 
time provide the means by which an orderly transfer to a market-oriented 
economy could be achieved. 
6. A comparison of the economic bases of two mral communities suggests that a 
long term land retirement program must include safeguards on the proportion of 
land retired in any mral area and that efforts would be necessary to ease the 
program's effects on local towns and communities. 
7. Technological change has brought about a considerable change in the stmcture of 
farms, increasing their size and decreasing labor inputs, but the growth in 
technology has far outpaced the rate of change in farm structure. The result is 
that an immense amount of stmctural change still faces the mral areas--both farms 
and communities. 
8. Future farm programs should explicitly recognize the vast change that technology 
is causing in mral areas and attempt to (a) facilitate the transfer of labor which is 
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cast off in the process of technological innovation, and (b) continue a measure of 
control over the excess food producing capacity which this technology continues 
to expand. 
9. Bargaining power through the implementation of strong controls on agricultural 
production has the potential to raise price levels on farm commodities somewhat 
above present levels without severe effects on domestic or export demand. 
However, offsetting reductions in quantities sold and in government payments 
received will likely cause net farm income to be somewhat lower than under 
present programs. 
10. Present programs, while providing considerable income support to the 30 percent 
of farmers who market 85 percent of all farm commodities, do not provide (a) 
any means by which agriculture can eventually achieve self-sustaining balance 
between supply and demand at acceptable price levels without the $3 billion 
annual expenditure under present programs, and (b) provide only negligible 
assistance to the majority of farmers, particularly those who suffer losses from 
technological advance and must shift to other alternatives but lack the necessary 
training for productive employment elsewhere. 
11. The shift to a long term land retirement program could facilitate eventual 
reduction in the cost of government programs and provide funds to offer retaining 
programs or educational incentives to labor resources released from agriculture by 
technological advance. The permanent shift of both land and labor resources to 
other uses could move the agricultural sector toward a resource balance which is 
in keeping with the capital-intensive, labor-extensive agricultural economy which 
industrialization and economic development has brought to the United States. 
12. The final selection among farm policy alternatives is a process which relates to 
society at large as it considers the distribution of the costs and gains of farm 
technological advances, among consumers, commercial farmers, and various 
groups of the rural community, the total costs of each type of program and the 
public acceptability of different types of policies. However, given the outlook 
provided in this study and the urgency of public investments to solve other broad 
social problems, careful consideration must be given to the appropriateness of 
future farm programs in providing long-run solutions, efficient coverage of the 
entire rural community, reasonable treasury costs and market feasibility. 
INTRODUCTION 
This study seeks: 
l. To establish a perspective for understanding the role of agricultural policy in the 
broader framework of national economic growth and development. 
2. To outline the major problem facing the agricultural industry and indicate the 
relationship of these problems to farm prices and incomes. 
3. To analyze alternative farm programs which could be implemented to ease the 
problems of agriculture. 
4. To provide estimates of production levels, price and income levels, and farm 
program costs for each alternative farm program. 
5. To evaluate potential effects of long-term land retirement programs on the 
economic structure of a rural community. 
BACKGROUND 
Farm policies in the United States have long centered on price support and 
compensatory-type farm programs which initially grew out of the severe economic plight of 
the farm economy some three decades previously. The problems of the 1930's were 
temporary. However, the basic framework of policies used during that period to meet 
short-run emergencies have been extended to the present. True, some large modifications 
have been made in programs. Food aid to low income families has been extended and 
broadened to a world wide basis. Other modifications also have been made. However, the 
basic format of programs to solve problems of large capacity and depressed prices and 
incomes in agriculture is generally the same set initiated in the 1930's. The focus of these 
programs has been on the short run problems immediately ahead. The programs have 
attempted to deal with the price and income problems resulting from a set of forces which 
are rapidly changing the structure of agriculture. But they have not dealt with the forces 
themselves. 
This long concentration on short-term farm programs and solutions initiated at 
the time of the Great Depression has clouded both an understanding of the basic problems 
and their more durable solution. The problems of agriculture are of long-term nature 
because they stem from a set of forces which are closely intertwined with the process of 
economic growth and development. Many of these problems can only be fully understood 
and solved in the context of national economic growth and development. The discussion 
below explains the interrelationships between agricultural change and economic 
development, the farm problems which emerge from this setting and the context in which 
agricultural policies must be formulated if they are to solve these problems. 
Farm Policy in Perspective 
Farm policy in the United States can be defined as that set of public programs 
adopted by the federal government and directed toward the agricultural industry. 
Agricultural policy is only one of many national policies affecting the actions of different 
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sectors. A general example of policy for nonfarm industries is antitrust legislation. A specific 
example is the oil depletion allowances for the petroleums industry. Similarly, other 
government policies facilitate growth, provide direction and serve as restraints on labor 
unions, educational institutions and the consuming public. 
Within the broader framework of government policies, agricultural policy has 
gradually adjusted over the last century to national economic development. As development 
occurred, these policies have taken many forms. The first federal policies for agriculture 
were specifically developmental in nature. They attempted to develop the nation's land and 
extend the productivity and output of the farm industry. These developmental policies 
extended the supply and decreased the price of resources. Initially, governmental policy 
focused on distributing land at very low cost among persons who would utilize and improve 
it. As land became less plentiful government policy emphasized enlarged supplies and 
favorable prices of other inputs. Information on new technologies was supplied through the 
Extension Service and other agencies. Credit to facilitate the adoption of new capital-using 
technologies was reduced in cost and the use of other inputs such as fertilizer and electricity 
was encouraged through various government policies. Each of these policies helped extend 
the productivity of agricultural resources and the output of the farm industry. In general, 
developmental policies to increase the productivity and output of agriculture was the overall 
orientation of farm policy over the period from the nation's birth to 1930. 
The set of developmental policies implemented for agriculture is similar in certain 
ways to governmental policies adopted for other industries. The railroad industry benefited 
from somewhat similar developmental policies early in the nation's history. Through policies 
adopted by the government, railroads received free sections of land which in tum could be 
sold to cover costs of establishing rail lines and purchase of equipment. Rail rates were 
unregulated and the lack of competition sometimes allowed rapid expansion of the capital 
base for building roads. These particular policies enabled railroads to expand at a rapid rate 
during the 19th century. 
Another industry which benefited from developmental policy was petroleum. 
Through the establishment of the depletion allowance, the government provided for 
one-fourth of petroleum sales to be free of income taxes. This provision allowed the 
industry to retain large funds which could be used for investment and growing returns. This 
infusion of capital caused the petroleum industry to expand rapidly while holding the cost 
of fuel at reasonable levels. The increased production and reasonable prices of fuel acted as a 
catalyst in the expansion of other industries, the automobile and airplane industries being 
prime examples. The practice of heating homes with gas probably expanded at a more rapid 
rate because of this policy. On the other hand, the coal industry probably suffered major 
losses of revenue due to the above policies. 
It is evident that the federal government adopted policies to facilitate expansion 
of many industries in the U.S. These various developmental policies which the government 
followed had the effect of rapidly moving natural resources into production. As the 
productive resource base expanded, growth in total output occurred. This 
process-characterized as economic development-brought a slowly improving standard of 
living to millions of Americans. 
Demand for Food with Economic Development 
For agriculture, the initial effect of economic development was a rapidly 
expanding demand for food. A large portion of increasing incomes, in both agriculture and 
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other parts of the economy, was devoted to increased food consumption and improved 
diets. Combined with a rapidly growing population, rising income and a favorable export 
market, the demand for food expanded as fast as food production. With a strong demand 
for food, agriculture grew rapidly in output and income during the last part of the 19th and 
the early part of the 20th century. This period came to be known as the Golden Age of 
Agriculture. 
Had the processes of economic development been understood in 1915, it would 
have been obvious then that agriculture could not continue to rapidly increase output 
without downward pressure on farm prices. The reason is inherent in the process of 
economic development. If continued over an adequate period, economic development raises 
per capita incomes to higher and higher levels. After incomes pass certain minimum levels, 
consumers eat little additional food. Instead they spend additional income on other goods 
and services which have more "stretch" both in the amount which can be consumed and the 
amount spent on them. Hence, as an example, they proceed from candles to coal-oil lamps, 
from coal-oil lamps to gas lanterns and from gas lanterns to electricity. Today, as technology 
proceeds and modern industry produces such things as refrigerators and color TV's, the 
incentive to shift relative expenditures is even stronger. But whatever the level of affluence 
and stage of development, as consumers pass certain minimum levels of income, their 
demand for food reaches a plateau. For some increment of income change, food demand 
shifts toward higher protein diets with greater consumption of meat, milk, cheese and other 
high protein food. But eventually even this shift is completed and increases in food demand 
tapers off. At this point, aggregate demand for food becomes more nearly a function of the 
upward trend in population growth than of increases in income. 
Thus the second factor which affects the demand for food and is itself affected by 
economic development, is population growth. Food demand expands in about a one to one 
ratio with population growth. When the population of the United States was growing 
rapidly early in the 20th century-both because of high birth rates and high immigration 
rates- the demand for food was also rapidly expanding. But as economic development 
occurred, the birth rate declined. Also, as the land area became fairly well settled and 
resources were moderately developed, immigration laws restrained population growth from 
this source. As population growth slowed, growth in food demand tapered off. When added 
to the income effect, slower population growth caused a further slowdown in expansion of 
food demand. Both these effects had a considerable effect on the demand for the output of 
the agricultural industry. 
While this process has already occured in the United States, it is still occurring in 
other parts of the world. Agriculture fills a different role in those countries where 
development has not proceeded to the extent of the United States. For example, a 
comparison of various nations in different stages of development suggests how agriculture's 
role and contribution in the national economy changes as development occurs. In Table 1, 
highly developed countries are compared with those still in lower stages of development. 
The relationships are fairly clear; in the developed nations, value of output per capita in 
agriculture is higher, the contribution of agriculture to the economy is smaller, the 
proportion of manpower employed in agriculture is less and the income elasticity of demand 
for food is lower. In the developing nations, agriculture contributes a higher proportion of 
total output, employs a larger proportion of manpower and has only half as much output 
per capita. As a result of the lower levels of output (income) per capita and the higher 
proportion of people in agriculture, the income elasticity of demand for food is much 
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Table .J..... Comparisons of major variables related to agriculture in economically developed and 
economically developing nations within the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD).!/ 
Country 
Develo~ed nations 
United States 
Canada 
Sweden 
Germany 
France 
Britain 
Develo~ing nations 
Italy 
Ireland 
Greece 
Spain 
Portugal 
Turkey 
Total value of 
output per 
capita in 
agriculture 
$2,691 
1,809 
1,703 
1,345 
1,310 
1,292 
$683 
643 
394 
314 
284 
193 
Percent of 
total output 
produced by 
agriculture 
4.1 
6.9 
4.7 
5.1 
9.2 
3.9 
16.9 
23.4 
28.6 
28.6 
24.3 
40.6 
Percent of 
total employ-
ment located 
in agriculture 
8.5 
12.1 
13.2 
12.6 
20.7 
4.0 
28.0 
35.1 
53.4 
41.9 
44.2 
74.9 
Income elasti-
city of demand 
for food at 
retail]/ 
0.08 
0.15 
0.20 
0.25 
0.25 
0.24 
0.42 
0.23 
0.49 
0.56 
0.60 
0.49 
Y Source: O.E.C.D. Agriculture and Economic Growth, A Report by a Group of Experts. 
O.E.C.D. Publications. Paris 1965. Table 1 and 16, pp.22 and 56. All data are for 1962. 
lJ The elasticity of demand for food is defined as the percentage change in quantity 
demanded associated with a given percentage change in income. 
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higher. In these countries, increases in income would have a sizable effect on the 
consumption of food. In Turkey a ten percent increase in income would raise food demand 
4.9 percent while in the United States a similar increase in income would raise food demand 
only 0.8 percent. These relationships suggest why increases in per capita income in the 
United States have little effect on the demand for food. In previous periods when the 
United States was more nearly a developing nation, the income elasticity of demand was 
substantially higher. In 1900 when average per capita output (income) was more nearly like 
Italy's, income elasticity was five times higher than at present. Then a 10 percent increase in 
income raised food consumption by 4 percent or more. Under these conditions, food 
production could expand at a rapid rate without outdistancing demand, especially as 
population also grew rapidly. But the process of economic development changed all that. 
With a rapid growth in productivity of land and labor in agriculture, the demand situation 
just would not absorb all farmers could produce without either a larger reduction in price or 
a large reduction in labor used and land cropped. 
Besides slower rates of increase in demand for food, rapid growth in supply also 
caused agriculture to face supply- demand imbalances beginning in the 1920's. When food 
demand was growing rapidly early in the 20th century, the ability of agriculture to increase 
output was relatively limited. Greater output required that additional acres of prairie be 
converted into arable cropland, that arid lands be converted to irrigation and that 
farm-based improvements in technology be applied. With limited horsepower and other 
restraints slowing the development of new land in the early 1900's, this method of 
expanding food production was relatively slow. Somewhat after 1920, and especially after 
1945, additional acres of cropland were no longer the major source of increased farm 
output. Instead, increases in food output came from adding new kinds of yield-increasing 
inputs from nonfarm sources to farmland. These inputs became readily available because of 
mass production and widely adopted because (1) their cost was relatively low, (2) they were 
relatively easy to apply, (3) they resulted in rapid increases in yields of crops and total 
production, and ( 4) the education levels of farmers facilitated their use. Over the past two 
decades these new inputs have increased greatly the supply of agricultural commodities in 
the United States and the capacity of the nation's farm industry. 
The potential imbalance between potential food supplies and effective demand 
came into greatest focus following the cessation of war-inspired demand following the 
Korean war. Rapid growth in food production combined with the less rapid growth in food 
demand caused farm prices, which act to equate supply and demand, to decline. This decline 
was of a long term nature, and is continuing as new technology increases supplies of farm 
commodities against a more slowly increasing level of demand. 
Policy Problems Arising from Economic Development 
When the decline in farm prices initially became a serious problem in the 1920's 
and 1930's, the complex changes causing these problems were not visible or adequately 
analyzed. During the 1920's, the farm price problem was diagnosed as one of temporary 
over-production which population growth and higher incomes-the factors which had 
previously increased demand at rapid rates-would eventually cure. During the 1930's, it was 
diagnosed as low consumer incomes resulting from large scale unemployment during the 
depression. This diagnosis implicity assumed that ( 1) food demand would again increase at a 
more rapid rate, or (2) rates of increase in agricultural output achieved during and 
immediately after World War I could not be sustained. Had either prognosis proved true, 
quantities supplied and demanded by consumers would have moved into closer proximity 
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with resulting price improvement. Even slow increases in demand against a slower increase in 
supply would have caused farm prices to improve. Too, had the demand for food again 
accelerated, the related problems of large production at low prices would have disappeared. 
This prognosis provided the policy orientation for several years after agriculture suffered 
major prolonged problems of over-production and low prices during the 1920's. 
But such a diagnosis did not give adequate consideration to changes occurring 
both in farming and in sectors related to agriculture, sectors which would have increasing 
effects on farm production. Underestimated were the new capital technologies being 
developed by research and adopted by farm producers. Some of the new technologies 
mainly represented practices initiated at the farm level. Examples were improved rotations 
and rations, improved livestock breeds, conservation measures, and better tillage methods. 
But some of the more important ones came from nonfarm sources and included such capital 
items as high-yielding seed, fertilizer, insecticide, ration additives and others. In earlier days, 
the research on a new type of input or farm practices was first. Then it was slowly extended 
to farmers who used it in practice. Increasingly in later decades, the product representing the 
technology has been developed side-by-side with research on yield effects and it has been 
rapidly put into use as soon as it was perfected. The result of the more rapid application of 
these capital technologies has been a great growth in farm productivity at the same time 
domestic food demand growth has been slackening. And the process shows no signs of 
diminishing. 
Potential increases in farm output resulting from these new capital technologies 
were not foreseen by either farm groups or the general public, neither were they accurately 
estimated by analysts who projected food production to later dates . .!l Also the distribution 
of gains and losses falling on an industry which rapidly increases supplies of commodities for 
a demand which is inelastic and increasing slowly was not well understood. The prevailing 
view was that agricultural output should continue to grow as it had during periods when 
domestic food demand was rising rapidly. But the process of economic development-the 
relative decline in food demand as incomes rise and population growth slows, and the shift 
of consumer expenditure toward other goods to improve the level of home life-precluded 
continuing large increases in domestic food output. Instead, as food demand increased more 
slowly and large foreign markets did not open up, agricultural output in turn needed to 
expand at a slower rate. But adoption of new capital technology raised crop yields rapidly. 
As yields went up, total production also expanded. The result was a measure of 
11 See for example: USDA, "What Peace Can Mean For American Farmers: Past 
War Agriculture and Employment," Misc. Pub. 562, May 1945; "Long-Range Agricultural 
Policy: A study of Selected Trends and Factors Relating to the Long-Range Prospects for 
Agriculture," Committee on Agriculture, U.S. House of Representatives, 80th Congress, 
2nd Session, Washington D.C., March 1948; "Resources for Freedom: A Report to the 
President's Materials Policy Commission" (The Policy Commission) Washington D.C., 
1952; USDA, "Land and Waters Potentials and Future Requirements for Water," A 
Report to the Select Committee on National Water Resources, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 
Committee Print No. 12, Washington D.C., 1959; USDA, "Our Farm Production 
Potential 1975," Agric. Info. Bul. No. 233, Sept. 1960; USDA, "Farm Production, 
Trends, Prospects and Programs," Agric. Info. Bul. 239, May 1961. These studies 
consistently underestimated increases in per acre crop yields and growth in total farm 
output. 
-7-
overproduction in agriculture, which led to lower prices and incomes. 
Under normal circumstances, continued low prices and incomes in a particular 
sector of the economy lead to a reduction in resources employed. Resources transfer to 
other sectors where incomes are higher. This is a major function of prices, with their effect 
on income levels, to indicate to producers whether more or less of a particular product is 
demanded by consumers. 
Agriculture has long labored under this kind of pressure. The invention and 
dissemination of new capital technology has caused farm labor and land to become more 
productive. After 1935, the adoption of improved plant varieties and commercial fertilizers 
especially caused output to increase rapidly. With food demand, other than during war 
conditions, increasing slowly, less land was needed for crop production. In addition, 
improved capital technology allowed each farmer to operate more land. The shift from 
animal to mechanical power doubled the acres of cropland which one operator could farm. 
Recent increases in capacity of power and machine units have further added to the pressures 
for these kinds of changes. Along with fewer crop acres required for crop production, fewer 
farmers were needed in agriculture. 
Basically, the reduced need for agricultural labor and land for crops has been an 
outgrowth of economic development processes. As development occurred, new technology 
represented by capital items has come to be priced low relative to labor and has served 
directly to replace farm workers. As production methods shifted away from labor, an 
increasing amount of capital has been added to each worker. For those workers able to 
surround themselves with sufficient quantities of capital, greatly increased productivity has 
resulted. As their efficiency improved, these workers have been able to sharply increase the 
quantity of output produced on a given land area. For those individual farmers able to 
increase output more than the decline in price, an improvement in income generally 
resulted. But large increases in aggregate output could no longer be absorbed without price 
reductions. Either aggregate output had to be cut back or both prices and total farm income 
would fall. 
Change Arising from Economic Development 
Increased efficiency is an important ingredient of economic growth and 
development. It allows a rise in income levels and living standards to goals which are widely 
held and sought in the United States. But while goals of higher incomes and improved living 
standards are widely accepted, the means and places for achieving these goals were not 
always so readily accepted. This is especially true when a particular industry experiences an 
absolute decline in resources employed and a relative decline in demand. The livery stable 
industry is a sector where the demand for services fell to nearly zero in only two decades. 
The automobile eliminated the need for shopkeepers to care for horses used 
in transportation. Strong resistance met this reduction in employment and income. While 
some forms of protest against the automobile around 1900 appear humorous today, they 
were no less serious than those exercised today with respect to farm conditions. New York 
State required that a "mature person" precede each automobile by one-eighth of a mile to 
warn the populace of the vehicle's approach. In Vermont, automobiles had to be preceded 
by a man carrying a lighted red lantern. In other states, automobiles were required to stop 
and shut off motors when horses approached. Automobiles were forbidden within the city 
limits in Mitchell, South Dakota and were required to drive only on specified side streets in 
Boston. These and other means were used to discourage change from one form of 
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transportation to a newer form. The decline of the livery stable industry was a great loss to 
some members of society in the early part of this century. 
Many of the changes occurring in agriculture have also been looked upon with 
uncertainty. Various means have been used to restrain them. But, these changes are an 
inherent part of the process of economic development which increases income levels and 
living standards in general. But they also bring losses or sacrifices to some people. 
In retrospect, the reduction in labor used in agriculture has been an outgrowth of 
the process of economic development. This process is a definite goal of a society which 
desires higher incomes and an improving standard of living. Economic development leads to 
increased efficiency of the working force or an increase in the quantity of output per unit of 
input. For an industry where growth in output is highly limited by demand, further effort in 
increasing output per unit of input implies that the number of inputs must decline. And this 
is the situation facing United States agriculture. Potential output has grown more rapidly 
than demand; the result being less manpower needed and the prevalence of reduced 
commodity prices. During the period when agriculture has needed less manpower, other 
industries have been in the process of great expansion. Had these industries required the 
same skills used in agriculture, relocating families from fanning to expanding industries 
would have eased adjustment problems in both industries. But this simple answer did not 
exist. Few fanners were trained to fill jobs in the nonfarm areas of the economy. In 
addition, nonfarm jobs were generally located in cities away from the rural areas, and the 
cost of moving older and established families was significant. These restraints have held 
more manpower in agriculture than was consistent with the income power of the industry 
and the highly productive new technology put into use by fanners. To some extent this 
situation still exists, although a large migration of farm families to urban areas has already 
occurred. 
MAJOR PROBLEMS OF AGRICULTURE 
The process of economic development causes substantial change in the farm 
sector. New technology provides the means by which farmers substitute large machines and 
other technology for labor and land. Instead of using two small tractors, two men and 
conventional seed, a fanner can use one large tractor, new plant varieties and fertilizer to 
produce 150 bushel corn instead of 75 bushel corn. With stable demand, the outcome is half 
as many men needed to operate tractors and half as many acres to produce corn. But 
resources-men and acres-do not readily shift to nonagricultural uses. The process is slow, 
with resources adjusting to needs only over substantial periods of time. As a result, the 
agricultural industry tends toward an almost constant state of imbalance. In the United 
States this imbalance has taken the form of too large an output and depressed prices. On the 
individual farm low prices received on a small quantity of output has resulted in low 
incomes for many of the nation's farm families. 
The Problem of Overcapacity in Agriculture 
While much past discussion on farm problems has centered around low prices and 
incomes, the underlying problem is the rapid growth in farm production capacity relative to 
demand. The problem of large potential production capacity for major grain commodities 
has been with agriculture for several decades. And there are several indicators that this 
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capacity has increased in recent years. One indicator is the fewer acres of cropland required 
for crop production. As shown in Figure 1, total acres of land used for crops fell by 10 
percent after 1955 and remained at this lower level through 1967. In general, this reduced 
cropland, even when output was still increasing, reflects the substitution of new capital 
technology for land. As a result of a 45 percent increase in yields between 1950 and 1968, 
reduced acreages have been possible for the major crops-wheat, feed grains and cotton. 
CROP PRODUCTION PER ACRE AND 
CROPLAND USED FOR CROPS 
"OF1950 
..... , ••••• INDICATIONS. 
U. L DIPAITMINT Of AGitcUL TUitE NEG. ERS 1351·17 (9) ECONOMIC IIHMCK IIIVICI 
FIGURE I 
Various types of government programs have held these crop acres out of 
production. After the initiation of the Soil Bank Program in 1956, land retirement programs 
grew considerably in numbers of acres retired (Figure 2). A decade after the programs wery 
initiated, total retired land exceeded 60 million acres. The cost of retiring these acres has 
been slowly rising, both per acre and in total. In 1966, the average cost per acre was over 
$40 and total cost was above $3 billion. 
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The record of individual crop acreages suggests that most of agriculture's 
overcapacity relates to the production of grain commodities. Although total acres available 
for cropping remained fairly stable, wheat acreages dropped sharply between 1950 and 
1955. Even though most of these acres remained out of production, wheat production 
increased rapidly after 1957 (Figure 3). Wheat yields rose, averaging over 50 percent higher 
in the 1960's as compared to 1950. Total production in 1966 was 30 percent higher 
although acreage was 20 percent lower. In 1967, acres harvested increased, yields decreased, 
but total production rose to record levels even though cropland used for wheat was well 
below levels of the early 1960's. Wheat yields were lower due partially to below normal 
weather in the Southern Plains and partially to increased acres harvested. But evidence 
available indicates that if wheat acreage returned to early 1960 levels, total wheat 
production would climb to near 2 billion bushels. Unless exports were to increase similarly 
either stocks would have to climb rapidly or prices would become extremely depressed. 
WHEAT ACREAGE, YIELD AND PRODUCTION 
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Feed grain production in recent years also emphasizes rapid farmer strides in 
applying yield-increasing capital- intensive practices-strides which have greatly increased the 
potential production of these crops. For the last decade, encouraged by land retirement 
programs, there has been a large reduction in acres of feed grains harvested (Figure 4 ). Acres 
used for feed grains fell nearly 40 percent between 1955 and 1962. But yields and 
production of feed grains have been quite the reverse. Both have increased. Since 1962, the 
upward trend in production has been almost completely explained by changes in crop 
yields. Acreage has varied only slightly over this period. 
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Smaller acreages of both wheat and feed grains and larger numbers of retired acres 
emphasize the considerable excess or reserve capacity available for grain production. Yields 
and production of these crops have been rising as new seed varieties, heavier fertilizer 
applications, new tillage methods, effective weed and insect control and more timely 
techniques of operation have become widely used. Only through government programs has 
production been held to levels more consistent with growth in market demand. 
Even though land used for crops over the last decade decreased however, the 
problem of large production was not completely eliminated. During this period, storage of 
major commodities fluctuated considerably. While land retirement programs removed 
several million acres of cropland from production between 1956 and 1960, stocks of most 
grain crops increased. Wheat carryover grew to 1.4 billion bushels in 1961 (Figure 5). Feed 
grain stocks, shown in Figure 6, also increased during this period. With the initiation of 
enlarged land retirement programs for wheat and food grains in the 1961 (Figure 2), stocks 
of these grains began to decline. By 1967, after six years of large retirement programs and 
greatly increased export programs, stocks of grains were reduced to more moderate levels. 
Wheat stocks approached 400 million bushels and feed grain stocks 40 million tons slightly 
below estimates of optimum carryover levels prepared for the National Advisory 
Commission on Food and Fiber in 1967 .Jj Those estimates suggested that reserve stocks of 
wheat should vary between 550 and 650 million bushels and feed grains between 35 and 45 
million tons. While this decline in stocks took place, the United States had an average of 
58.0 million acres of cropland retired from production. Had these acres remained in 
JJ Frederick V. Waugh. Reserve Stocks of Farm Products. Volume V, Technical Papers, 
National Advisory Commission On Food and Fiber. Washington, D.C., 1967, p. 52. 
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production, there is a high probability that grain stocks would have continue upward. As a 
result of 1967 and 1968 crop production levels, stocks are again increasing. 
CARRYOVER OF WHEAT BY CLASS FEED GRAIN CARRYOVER 
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Stocks of one major crop did increase after 1961. The carryover of cotton (Figure 
7) trended downward after 1956 when the Conservation Reserve removed large acreages of 
land from cotton production in the Southeast. However, much of this land was retired for 
only a short period. When it began to return to production after 1959, carryover stocks of 
cotton again increased. By 1966, when a new program for reducing cotton production was 
implemented, carryover stocks were above 16 million bales, well over the 9 million bales 
annually used for domestic consumption since 1960. A 40 percent reduction in acreage and 
lower yields of cotton in 1966 and 1967 resulted in a sharp decline in carryover stocks, but 
stocks are still above annual domestic needs. Although cotton is still a problem, CCC total 
inventories have been reduced as Figure 8 indicates. However, larger production levels of 
1968 could again cause this situation to change and inventories to increase. 
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Government land retirement programs have helped bring about a reduction in 
total inventories of agricultural commodities over the last decade. Of equal importance, 
however, has been enlarged export programs. Exports of major farm commodities have 
increased at a rapid rate, rising from $3.1 billion in 1955 to $6.8 billion in 1967 (Figure 9). 
Of the $6.8 billion of farm commodities exported in 1967, commercial exports made up 
$5.2 billion. Of these commercial exports $1.4 billion moved with some government 
assistance. Of the $1.6 billion government sponsored exports, $0.8 billion required some 
amount of government assistance. All together, $4.6 billion of exports, or 68 percent of 
total exports moved into world markets without any government assistance. The remaining 
32 percent, $2.2 billion, required some amount of government assistance in the form of an 
export subsidy such as payment in cash or in kind or by sales from Commodity Credit 
Corporation stocks at less than domestic prices. 
$ 
U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS: COMMERCIAL 
AND UNDER GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 
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FIGURE 9 
While an average of 32 percent of all agricultural exports required some 
government assistance payments, a much higher percentage of specific crops required 
government assistance. Over one-half of all wheat and flour exports moved under 
government programs in 1967 (Figure 1 0). Exports of feed grains, cotton and rice also were 
assisted by various government programs. 
-14-
U.S. AGRICULTURAl EXPORTS, 
BY COMMODITY GROUP, 1967 * 
Ollooodo & products 
Food trains, ••••• 
oxcl. products 
Ani•alo & products •• 
Tollacco, un•anuf. ••• 
Cotton, oxcl. linton •• 
I 
Fruits & voeotabloo ••••••••• I 
lico, •lllod ············~===~F}J Other···················~ 
I 
0 300 
. I Gov't A Commercia program ~ 
I 
600 900 1,200 
$MIL. 
$ YI'AII.I'HDIHG JUHI' .JO. 6 GOVI'II.HMI'HT•FIHMICI'D I'II.OCRAM$, P.L. 13-410 AND I'.L. 17-ltl, 
1,500 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE NEG. ERS 2906•67 (9) ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE 
FIGURE 10 
As exports of agricultural commodities have increased, acres of cropland to 
produce these commodities have also grown. Total acres harvested for export increased from 
31 million acres in 1953 (Figure 11 ), to 70 million acres in 1966. Of crops produced on this 
acreage, the food grains wheat and rice, had the highest proportion exported (Figure 12). 
Exports were over 50 percent of production for these two grains. A significant portion of 
the total production of cotton, tobacco, soybeans and grain sorghum also moved into world 
markets. 
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To an extent, the increase in exports over the last decade is somewhat misleading. 
Almost one-third of these exports, representing the produce of more than 20 million acres 
of cropland, moved under government assistance of some type. Without programs of export 
assistance, most of these acres of cropland would not have been required for crop 
production; or their product would depress domestic prices or cause growing carryovers. 
Without government export programs, additional acres of cropland would have had to be 
retired to maintain commodity prices. Hence, along with the nearly 60 million acres of 
cropland retired annually since 1961, land used for publicly-assisted exports adds a con-
siderable potential to domestic supplies. If export subsidies were reduced or eliminated, 
some portion of this output would not be exported. Instead it would place additional 
pressure on domestic markets and commodities' prices until production was reduced. 
It is clear from this review that the United States has considerable excess capacity 
for production of grains. That this excess capacity is no longer temporary is evident. As long 
as new capital technology continues to pour into agriculture at recent rates, productive 
capacity will continue to grow faster than the expansion in domestic and commercial 
demand for food. With this pattern continuing or accentuating, a large excess capacity is 
now in prospect for the next two or more decades. 
Patterns of Adjusting to New Technology 
While a considerable part of the rapid change occurring in agriculture can be 
traced to the mechanization and industrialization inherent in economic development, there 
is little prospect that society will stop or even slow substantially this rate of change. 
Economic growth has become a definite policy goal of the United States, as it has for most 
other nations of the world. At this nation's stage of development, technology and intellect 
have become a special means for attaining a high living standard through rapid economic 
growth rates. New technology for agriculture has been promoted through public investment, 
a rapidly growing investment in the private sector and through a fall-out of knowledge from 
other sectors. This impetus is not diminishing and is expected to pick up in tempo. It will do 
so as the private sector is encouraged to develop more new capital technologies which can be 
used in the farm industry. It will do so as farmers continue to increase in intellectual 
awareness and rapidly put new capital technologies to work. Accentuation will come 
because of the profitability to the individual, although not necessarily in market aggregate, 
and because the new forms of inputs have favorable prices, relative to the commodities they 
produce. 
While this process picked up momentum since World War II, it had already begun 
after World War I. The farm work force reached a peak around 1920, then began to decline 
as favorably priced capital items began to substitute for labor. Similarly, the indirect 
substitution of capital technology for land began to be important in the 1920's. However, 
the land replaced by new techniques remained in crop production, bolstering output and 
burdening prices. This process was not understood during the 1930's because of the 
depression or during the 1940's because of the abnormal wartime demand. 
As a part of this process, agriculture has interacted with other industries in the 
evolutionary process changing the shape of all major industries. Farmers gave the nation an 
abundant food supply and freed the masses of people from concern over supplies of food. In 
net, the reduction of the farm work force has provided the equivalent in manpower for 
concentrating on exploits of space, assistance to other nations, and in shifting of consumer 
urgencies from such things as stick shifts and black and white television to automatic 
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transmissions and colored T.V. Unfortunately, however, while the reduction in the farm 
work force allowed manpower for these other endeavors, those persons working directly as 
farm laborers seldom have had the skills for these pursuits. 
But lack of skills has not prevented migration from agriculture. Since 1910, the 
reduction of labor in agriculture, as Figure 13 indicates, has brought a considerable shift in 
the residence of population in the United States. Rural to urban migration has occurred on 
an immense scale. From a farm population of 30 million persons in 1940, fewer than 12 
million persons remained on farms by 1966. In the period 1940-45, an average of 1.6 
million persons left the farm annually. Since 1945, as Figure 14 shows, migration has 
averaged nearly a million persons per year. Over 17 million persons have transferred from 
farm to other locations. 
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While the major change occurred as farm operators moved to non-farm jobs, hired 
farm labor also has moved. Agriculture had nearly four million hired workers two decades 
ago, but by 1966 the number has declined to 2.9 million (Figure 15). Too, in the process of 
national urbanization, the residence of the remaining workers shifted. While only a third of 
hired workers resided in non-farm residence two decades back, three-fourths now have 
non-farm residences. 
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The rapid immigration from agriculture has affected some age groups more than 
others. Young adults have rapidly left farming. This selective migration has given the 
remaining farm population a skewed age distribution. The largest segment of the farm 
population, nearly 30 percent, is under 14 years of age (Figure 16). The age group 14 to 24 
is smallest, except for those over retirement age. A slightly larger proportion falls in the 25 
to 44 age group, and 25 percent is in the 45 to 64 age group. Some 10 percent of the farm 
population is over 65 years. 
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With the migration of workers from farms, farm labor makes up a rapidly 
decreasing part of total production inputs. Between 1950 and 1966, labor declined from 40 
to 20 percent of total farm inputs. Most of this decline was in family labor (Figure 17), with 
a decline from 8 million to 4 million between 1950 and 1966. Other shifts are also occurring 
in the resource makeup of farms (Figure 18). Compared to 1950, farmers now use slightly 
less land and buildings, more power and machinery, almost twice as much feed, seed, and 
livestock inputs, and 2V2 times as much fertilizer and lime to produce a third more farm 
output. 
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The family operating pattern of American agriculture has caused farm numbers to 
decline simultaneously with farm families.ll As farm numbers declined, assets per farm 
increased from $20,000 to over $70,000 between 1950 and 1967 (Figure 19). The largest 
part of this increase came from higher real estate values; real estate assets per farm, not 
including the operator's dwelling, rose from $12,000 to $57,000. Real estate made up 78.2 
percent of the average farn1's assets in 1967. But part of the increase in assets results as 
farms enlarge and include a larger acreage. An increasing proportion of farmland purchases 
are for farm enlargement. In 1 966 this proportion had grown to 58 pemmt (Figure 20). In 
wheat areas of the U.S., farm enlargement accounted for 80 percent of all farmland 
purchases. Corn Belt farn1ers purchase 70 percent of additional crop acres for this purpose. 
These high percentages indicate that little land is changing hands for the purpose of new 
farm starts. Rather the large majority of land purchases is for the purpose of expanding the 
farm firm. 
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The economic development forces at work continue to press the farm industry 
towards larger size farms and smaller numbers. For those operators with sufficient capital 
and managerial skills for this process and the rapid updating of technology, there are 
rewards in the form of higher incomes. But for farmers who resources cannot fit into the 
pace of change required, there can be losses in the form of initial frustrations related to 
decisions on leaving the industry and later costs in moving and adapting to other 
employment alternatives. 
One of the major forces affecting the size of farms has been the changing costs of 
different inputs used in agriculture. As the price of labor rose and high capacity power units 
and machines have become readily available at relatively reasonable prices, farmers have 
continuously shifted away from labor and toward machines. The optimum combination of 
cropland and machinery has changed accordingly and farmers have found it necessary to 
increase the number of acres to hold down costs per acre. The magnitude of change implied 
by larger farm machines is indicated in Figure 21. These data, from a study for southern 
11 Farm numbers reach a high of 6.8 million in 1935, declined thereafter to 5.9 million in 
1945, 4.8 million in 1954,in 1954, 3.7 million in 1959, and totaled 3.2 million in 1964. 
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lowa, 11 show that optimum cropland-machinery combinations change sharply as machinery 
size increases. Explained simply, Figure 21 suggests that for each 1-plow increase in 
machinery size on an average farm in southern Iowa, acres of cropland should increase by 80 
acres-if per acre machine costs are to remain near a minimum. If a larger machinery 
combination is used on a smaller acreage, costs per acre and per bushel rise rapidly, reducing 
the net return to land and management. 
While machinery sizes, prices and availability are only some of the forces which 
have been causing pressures for farm enlargement, they nevertheless are of importance. One 
measure of how well farms have adapted to changing machinery sizes is shown in Figure 22. 
In 1950, commercial farms in Iowa averaged 124 crop acres per farm. Although no data.are 
available on the average size of machinery combinations used, farmers generally used 2-plow 
and 3-plow machinery combinations during this period. These machinery combinations 
would have been optimally used on 160 to 240 crop acres. By 1964 machinery size had 
generally increased to 4, 5 or 6-plow and even larger combinations. These machinery 
combinations would optimally have been used on 320, 400 or 480 acres of cropland (Figure 
22). But acres of cropland per farm as Figure 2 shows, had not generally increased by 
similar amounts. Commercial farms had increased to 148 acres per farm, still far below the 
least-cost land-machinery combination for 4, 5 or 6-plow equipment suggested in Figure 21. 
While acres per machinery combination can always be expected to be below optimum as 
farmers attempt to improve timeliness, these data still suggest that technological 
advancement in farm machinery has far outpaced changes in farm size. The necessary 
reduction in farm numbers implied by this comparison is large even though a substantial 
reduction in farm numbers has already occurred. 
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Besides the economies associated with optimum land-machinery combinations, 
other inputs on farms also show decreasing costs with increases in farm size. Some of the 
cost economies are indicated in the cost and return records for Iowa farmers who participate 
in Farm Records Associations (Figure 23). The value of crops produced per acre, a farmer's 
gross return, is almost constant (about $95 per acre) for farms varying from 160 acres to 
600 acres. But costs per acre decline significantly as farm size increases, dropping from $85 
per crop acre on 160-acre farms, to $56 per crop acre on 600-acre farms. Machine costs vary 
from $29 per acre on 160-acre farms down to $18 per acre on 600-acre farms, accounting 
for about one-third of the per acre decrease. Other categories of costs per acre for taxes, 
fertilizer and similar materials vary only a small amount by farm size. The one additional 
11 Loren Ihnen and Earl 0. Heady, Cost Functions in Relation of Farm Size and Machinery 
Technology in Southern Iowa. Research Bulletin 527. Iowa State University of Science 
and Technology. May 1964. 
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category which does vary more is operator and family labor cost per acre. As farm size 
increases, the charge or allowance for family and operator labor falls from $19 to $7 per 
acre. The man year of operator and family labor is spread over more acres on the larger 
farm, and labor cost per acre drops accordingly. 
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These differences in costs between large and small farms cause a large difference 
in net returns to land and management. On 160 acre farms net returns of $10 per acre gave a 
$1,600 return to land and management. But 600-acre farms had a net return of over $34 per 
acre and when combined with the larger number of acres gave over a $20,000 return to land 
and management from the cropping portion of the farm operation. While 600-acre farms 
were only 4 times larger in size, net returns were over 12 times as large. This differential 
provides an escalating incentive to increase farm size. Given this incentive, some farm 
operators will continue to expand farm size. Other farm operators with less than optimum 
combinations of land, labor and capital will find it increasingly difficult to compete as prices 
of farm commodities slowly trend downward to reflect the growing production capacity and 
output resulting from modern technology and lower costs of producing crops on larger 
farms. Reversing this trend would require a substantial restraint on producing capacity, a 
reduction in technology or a lowering of prices of other inputs used on smaller farms. While 
we do not pose man as the slave of technology, it hardly appears realistic that the rate of 
technological advance will be retarded under the nation's present stage of economic 
development with the emphasis that is placed on research, capital technology and economic 
growth. 
Gains and Losses from Technological Transformation 
Looked at in a historical perspective, the capitalization and industrialization of 
agriculture has released a large amount of manpower from food production. For the nation 
as a whole, the result is fewer labor resources used to produce the food and fiber needs of 
the population. For the farm family which leaves, the outcome may or may not represent an 
improvement in economic and social conditions. Families able to productively transfer to 
nonfarm occupations can generally improve their earning ability. But such a transfer 
requires added skills, education or training in general. These additions may have costs 
attached to them. In terms of social conditions, the transfer may have little effect if rural 
living is continued, even at the same annual income. If the transfer is to a larger sized city, 
however, social standings and real income may suffer considerably. 
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The rapid adoption of farm capital technologies brings gain to the urban or town 
industry which produces the new inputs. It brings gain to leading farmers with the capital to 
adopt them rapidly enough to increase profits. It brings gains to the workers who a;e 
employed to fabricate them. Unfortunately, however, the persons added to the payroll of 
fabricating plants are seldom those displaced from farming through the same capital 
technologies. Sacrifice, either in the short run or the long run, often is the reward of those 
who must leave farming. The sacrifices spread to the small towns of the rural community as 
the farm population thins through the process of technological improvement and farm 
consolidation. A reduced volume of business has a multiplier effect as it reduces retail 
volume for many establishments, reduces or lowers the income from employment in village 
businesses and provides lowered support generally for rural institutions. 
On the gain side, rapid technological advances bring gains to consumers in the 
form of lower real prices for food. It can even bring reduced absolute prices if the resulting 
larger output or supply potential is not offset by price supports or other policy measures. It 
also brings gains to consumers as workers are reduced in agriculture and more labor is 
available to produce other goods and services. In this context, farmers with capital enough 
to push rapidly forward in farm size and advanced technology can increase profits if they 
increase output by a greater proportion than prices decline. But farmers who are unable to 
do so bear a cost of structural change as their incomes decline. Falling particularly in this 
category are older farm persons, young farm families with insufficient capital and others out 
of reach of new technical knowledge and its implementation at the farm level. 
This distribution of gains and losses from the capitalization and technological 
transformation of agriculture is the basic policy issue for the nation. Unfortunately, farm 
policy has not been adequately treated in this light. Price support and supply control 
programs have been used to erase inequities between consumers and sufficiently large 
commercial farmers. But they have not done so for those displaced from agriculture with 
inadequate skills, for those who become underemployed in the country town and others. 
ORIENTATIONS OF PAST FARM POLICY 
At the end of World War II, the United States agriculture already was capable of 
producing more than domestic and commerical export markets could absorb at price levels 
acceptable to farmers. Even with restraints on production of new inputs the farm industry 
greatly increased output during the 1940-45, but the influx of new technology into 
agriculture was only beginning. Additional increases in output were readily possible as 
industry was able to turn new capital and manpower towards new and improved farm 
inputs. After 1946, large numbers of new and improved seeds, machines, fertilizers, 
insecticides, herbicides, ration additives and other yield-increasing or labor-saving inputs 
became available. Farm production began to rise rapidly, outstripping the domestic increase 
in food demand resulting from increments in both population and per capita incomes. 
While the Korean conflict and high price supports intervened around 1950, the 
termination of excess foreign demand caused overproduction in agriculture to again create 
problems for the nation by the mid 1950's. With the nation at an advanced state of 
economic development, increases in domestic demand for food were largely limited to 
population growth. Termination of the Korean activities and European recovery eliminated 
part of the war generated demand. However, supplies of farm commodities were still 
increasing as new and more capital technologies were used by farm operators. The nation 
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faced an imbalance between food needs and supplies as reflected through price levels and 
farm resource returns. 
The nation or farm industry had several choices in restoring balance between 
potential supplies and effective demand as related to resource returns in agriculture: (l) It 
could set a price level as many other industries do in the short run and adjust production to 
this level. (2) It could lessen the quantity of resources used in agricultural production, thus 
reducing output and spreading price increases over all producers. (3) It could help farmers 
out of agriculture, facilitate the expansion to larger units and reduced costs of production 
through a greater substitution of capital on larger farm units. ( 4) It could develop or create 
large markets outside the country. 
The main policy implemented was number 2, with only land being reduced 
through land withdrawal programs. Other resources (labor and capital) were left outside the 
realm of action programs. While some land inputs on many farms were immobilized, labor 
resources attached to the land were left in reduced employment or to find their own paths 
to other occupations. The land withdrawal programs, supplemented by price support 
programs through the Commodity Credit Corporation initiated in the 1930's, have been 
extended, with various types of modification, to the present. While they have also been 
supplemented by world food aid programs, they have done little to solve the more basic 
problems stemming from the structural transformation of agriculture. As detailed 
previously, these problems are of two sorts as new capital technology is fed into agriculture: 
( 1) The new capital technology serves as a substitute for land. Less land is needed for crops 
and could be shifted to outer uses. However, as long as it remains fully in crop production, 
output is large relative to demand and prices and resource returns are lower than they would 
otherwise be. (2) The new capital technology substitutes for labor and larger farms are 
needed to use it effectively. Farms which are unable to expand are squeezed between 
burdened prices and growing capital costs of production. Eventually, labor attached to these 
farms is released through retirement or transfer to other occupations. 
The land withdrawal programs, the direct payments associated with them, and 
price support programs have provided some temporary relief in this setting of rapid technical 
advance and farm structural transformation. Yet they have not eliminated the basic 
problems which are of long-run nature. The productive capacity of agriculture is still 
growing rapidly and supply ability is considerably greater than can be absorbed at present 
prices in domestic and foreign markets. Too, further rapid displacement of labor is in 
prospect. An "air of depression" will continue to hang over agriculture as long as these 
underlying structural imbalances remain. 
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR FUTURE FARM POLICY 
Compensatory programs for agriculture of the type financed by the federal 
government are now 35 years old. These programs have not brought agriculture into 
self-sustaining balance and they have no prospect of doing so in the next decade. They do 
not wholly solve the problems related to the distribution of gains and sacrifices brought 
about by rapid technological change and farm structural changes. They do little to solve the 
problems of poverty and desolation caused by technological advance. It seems realistic that 
farm policies should now better recognize the basic and long-run structural transformation 
occurring in rural America and attempt to ease the losses associated with such change. 
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Policies of the past have been of a compensatory nature since they tried to redress 
the losses which would have otherwise gone to commercial farmers. These policies are 
economically logical programs in the sense that they attempted to provide some positi-ve 
gains for the over-all farm industry as it brings gains to consumers in the form of lowered 
real prices of food and the release of labor resources for use in other sectors. Net gains to 
society are not guaranteed through changes which bring loss to some groups and benefits to 
others, however. While compensatory programs have brought or broadly restored gains to 
both the consumer, commercial farm and agribusiness sectors, sacrifices have still fallen on 
many other groups attached to agriculture. Included are groups such as labor displaced from 
agriculture without adequate skills for other employment, local businessmen with declining 
trade volume and others of the rural community. One goal of future farm policy should be 
that of programs to adequately compensate, either directly or indirectly, other important 
groups who otherwise suffer losses through the rapid technological advance of agriculture. 
Without such improvement in policy, political acceptance is unlikely for programs which 
give a better long-run solution to the problems and forces underlying excess capacity, labor 
underemployment and low resource returns in agriculture. 
Policy should now turn to a long-run format of balancing the resource mix in 
agriculture under the technological horizon now existing. The mix of resources now is more 
appropriate for the post World War II period and considerable reorganization lies ahead. It is 
obvious that technological improvement, growing productivity and reduced labor 
requirements in agriculture will continue. These problems will not disappear over the next 
decade and a half. Other research indicates that the farm labor force will decline by at least 
a third over the next dozen years and that production will grow to levels such that exports 
would have to triple if production capacity is to be absorbed and prices maintained or 
improved.lf 
Long-run policy should explicitly recognize that the nation will continue to have 
excess acres no longer required for crop production and a large supply capacity relative to 
demand. The constant improvement in farm technology almost guarantees that many of 
these acres may not be required for crop production again in the present century. 
The present policy of retiring surplus acres on a year-to-year basis does not 
provide a ·long-term shift of cropland to other uses. Since land retirement is mainly on a 
year-to-year and partial farm basis, the land is seldom shifted to noncrop uses. Expenditures 
are thus made over a period of time to restrain production, but at the end of the period the 
money has been paid out and the problem still remains. At current public outlays, extension 
of present programs over the next 10 years would require direct payments of $30 billion or 
more. However, with extension of trends in technology and production, the problem of 
excess capacity will still be as large as the present.l/ 
An alternative is to shift land from crop production in marginal areas on a 
long-run basis so that after the public expenditure has been made, a goal has been 
accomplished. Numerous means exist for attaining such long-run goals. Even if a long-run 
program of this nature ended with marginal land idle, it could still represent an 
improvement from an over-all societal standpoint. There are, of course, important extensive 
lf Earl 0. Heady and Leo V. Mayer. Food Needs and U.S. Agriculture in 1980. Technical 
Papers-Volume I. National Advisory Commission on Food and Fiber. Washington, D.C. 
August 1967. · 
11 See Heady and Mayer op. cit. for estimates of excess capacity under alternative farm 
programs in 1980. 
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uses for this land. The shift would, however, bring important policy needs to alleviate 
sacrifices and restore economic opportunity to large population groups in the communities 
affected. Transferring this land to permanent grass or trees requires a period of time. But 
present types of programs have already been in existence for nearly three and one-half 
decades. 
In addition to an improved resource mix for agriculture, government programs 
can continue to contribute over the long-run to both farmer and consumer welfare through 
mechanisms to stabilize agricultural production and prices. Stability of farm income, a 
major objective of farm programs since the 1930's is a relevant policy goal. While stability of 
retail food prices has not been stated as an objective of farm policy, it too is a relevant goal. 
The costs of farm programs are paid by society at large and especially by urban taxpayers. 
These groups have a basis for also expecting some gain from the programs in which they 
invest. Otherwise urban consumers may not continue willing to spend $4 billion annually on 
programs for controlling, storing and disposing of farm supluses, only to be faced with 
sharply higher food prices in years of reduced yields or increased foreign food needs. 
The maintenance of adequate food reserves to insure the nation against food 
shortages both at home and abroad also is a relevant goal for long-run policy. Over the last 
decade, the U.S. has exported over 20 percent of its total crop production. Hence, a 
domestic food shortage is not a major threat. However, the United States has developed a 
committment in helping other nations prevent mass starvation or even severe food shortages. 
An appropriate or even necessary goal for future policy is reserves of appropriate size for 
these purposes. We should, however, not use these reserves as a major means of supporting 
domestic prices or disposing of surplus production. Unselective use of this practice may have 
been beneficial to the United States in the short time span of the last decade. However, it is 
a very costly means per se for improving prices and handling domestic surplus stocks and 
capacity. Food aid should be in a different context. Knowledge now available suggest a 
continuing inability of many less developed nations to feed themselves in an intermediate 
period ahead. This prospect makes it necessary that our food aid policies carefully be 
reconsidered and meshed with the goal of increasing agricultural production in 
underdeveloped countries. The present policy, in essence, pays higher prices to farmers in a 
developed country so that they may increase production and ship the excess to less 
developed countries thus dampening incentives to producers there. Future policies should 
recognize that agriculture in many under-developed countries represents a primary industry 
which can stimulate the process of economic development. Farm policies should be designed 
accordingly so that farmers in underdeveloped countries have the incentive to expand 
production. The interrelationships between our domestic farm programs and international 
food aid should not retard or hamper this incentive. 
To an extent, our present policies may prevail because we have failed to 
understand the full interrelationships between economic development and agricultural 
problems. Just as we were unable to forsee technological developments over the last three 
decades, we now may not fully comprehend the importance of economic development in 
underdeveloped countries to the very long-run welfare of our domestic agriculture. This 
importance stems from the high income elasticities of demand for food in underdeveloped 
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countries. 11 These high elasticities give consumers a high propensity to consume additional 
food as their incomes rise. But a rise in income is dependent especially upon expansion of 
jobs in both agricultural and non agricultural sectors. This process must start at the pobt 
where these nations already have resources or favorable natural endowments. And this 
situation frequently is best found in agriculture. Our domestic policies should not conflict 
with goals of agricultural improvement and economic development in these countries. 
Economic development will expand the demand for food and allow greater world trade in 
food on a commercial basis, in contrast to long-run reliance on international public aid. 
Several objectives for long-run farm policies have been reviewed. Future programs 
should recognize both our very large long-run capacity for grain production and the basic 
structural change occurring in the farm industry. Rapidly advancing farm technology not 
only extends our future capacity but also increases the cost of restraining it as the means of 
supporting prices. For a given level of prices, greater yields increase the opportunity costs of 
leaving land idle. Hence, the payment per acre, especially if on the basis of year-to-year 
programs, requires increasingly large payments to encourage participation in land 
retirement. It is reasonable and logical that the nation attempt to develop a set of future 
programs which will hold capacity in check at lower government costs than are implied in 
present year-to-year programs. Such programs should ease the costs falling on communities 
which must provide the major adjustments for more efficient long-run solutions to the 
problems of large supply capacity and farm structural changes. 
These programs should continue to provide appropriate price stability at farm and 
consumer levels. Stability does not imply constant prices, but rather prices which fluctuate 
within modest bounds. Changes in price levels are necessary market signals, to be passed 
back to farmers, as long-run trends take place in farm technology, supply capacity, 
consumer preferences and national needs. 
EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS 
With a framework of goals established for future farm policy, we now proceed to 
evaluate several alternatives in future farm programs. On the positive side, present programs 
have raised and/or supported income of producers, particularly those who operate 
economically viable units and produce larger quantities of output. They have provided 
means for bringing some equity in the distribution of gains from technological advances 
between consumers and commercial farmers. They have aided stability of farm commodity 
prices, especially grains and cotton. Also, these programs have contributed toward assuring 
the nation an adequate supply of food for domestic and international uses, although not 
necessarily at minimum cost. They have had public acceptance, allowing "something to be 
done" for commercial agriculture. The rate of economic and social adjustment in rural areas 
may also have been slowed to rates which could more nearly be digested by rural 
communities and institutions.But these programs also have major limitations. The programs 
have high treasury costs. They provide little compensation to those marginal farmers who 
sacrifice most from technological advance. They have no promise for moving the industry 
soon toward a self-sustaining balance between production and utilization. 
Major weaknesses also revolve around the short-run, year-to-year, nature of 
present programs and insufficient provisions for improving economic opportunity for a large 
_ll See Table 1 for examples. 
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portion of the low-income sector of agriculture. This sector encompasses the major part of 
the 70 percent of all farms which have gross sales of less than $10,000. As Table 2 indicates, 
this group of farms contributes only a small part of total farm output, in fact only 14.9 
percent in 1967. These 2.2 million farms average only $1,717 of realized net farm income in 
1967; including the value of farm produced food and the rental value of the farm dwelling. 
These farms have a small share of farm sales and income, although they constitute a 
majority of farm families. They gain only a small share of the benefits resulting from price 
support levels generated by commodity loans, foreign aid programs and direct payments 
provided for idling land. These farms provide limited possibilities for an effective use of 
labor and generally provide low returns to this resource. 
Also left out of compensatory policies--the set of programs designed to bring 
equity in the distribution of gains from farm technical progress and large output capacity-is 
that portion of the farm labor force annually displaced from agriculture and the rural 
merchants who suffer income declines with a thinning farm population. As mentioned 
previously, lower-cost programs to contain a large producing capacity and provide long-run 
solutions for problems of farm structural change are unlikely to result until these groups are 
brought into either compensatory policies or provided improved economic opportunity in 
other pursuits. 
The 30 percent of farms with sales of $10,000 or over produced 85 percent of all 
farm commodities. Their average net income of $10,616, including prerequisites, exceeded 
the average income of $6,882 for all families in the United States in 1965.l/ Since present 
farm programs direct benefits to farmers largely in proportion to the amount of their 
resources and production, the 30 percent of farmers with sales of over $10,000 receive more 
than two-thirds of all government payments to farmers . .Y They stand to gain the major 
share of benefits directed to the farm sector as a result of our commodity programs. 
A reexamination of the present pattern of payment distribution is needed, 
especially in relation to those groups of the rural community who bear the costs of farm 
structural transformation and technological advance without any explicit compensation. 
The time has come in the evolution of American farm compensation policies when they 
should be oriented both to long-run solutions of the capacity problem and to a more 
complete spread of benefits to groups who bear costs of rapid technological transformations 
of agriculture. Given treasury restraints on the amount of funds for compensation of 
agriculture, the latter may call for some diversion of benefits from larger farms to low 
income families of agriculture, laborers displaced without adequate skills for other 
employment and other sacrificing groups of the rural community. One element of an 
over-all mechanism to accomplish this end would be a limit to size of benefits to individual 
farmers. A reexamination of the structure of programs and the distribution of benefits does 
not, of course, imply the elimination of farm programs. It poses the need for their 
improvement. With or without payment limits, the need for long-run orientation of 
programs to move agriculture to a direction of self-effecutuated balance between supply and 
demand is still necessary. Questions of the distribution of government payments and 
benefits should be solved independently from decisions of which programs are most 
effective for other purposes. 
1J U.S. Department of Commerce. Statistical Abstract of the United States: 
1967. p. 335. 
JJ Earl 0. Heady. A Primer on Food, Agriculture and Public Policy. Random House. 1967 
p. 16. 
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POLICY ALTERNATIVES 
Numerous policy alternatives exist for restraining the aggregate producing 
capacity of agriculture and providing a more equitable distribution of gains and costs of 
farm structural change. On the following pages, we explore four alternatives for handling the 
over-all problems of the agricultural sector. Other alternatives could be examined and future 
research will be devoted to them. The four analysed are those which seem especially 
pertinent because of their current existence or vigorous support over the last two years for 
policy needs during the 1970's. 
One alternative evaluated incorporates the concept of bargaining power for 
agriculture. The analysis is based on the proposed government pr9gram introduced in the 
90th Congress, 2nd Session, in bill form, and known as S.2973.!1 This bill would " ... 
create a board, to be known as the National Agricultural Relations Board . . :•JJ The 
function of this board after conducting its own investigations or upon petition from 
producers would be to " . . . initiate and conduct a referendum among producers of such 
agricultural commodity to determine whether or not said producers favor the establishment 
of a representative marketing committee ... for the purpo~e1 of negotiating with purchaser 
of the commodity to determine a fair minimum price .. . "11 To provide for control over 
supply, the act provides that "whenever a marketing committee shall have established a 
minimum price for any commodity and thereafter shall also determine that the total supply 
of said commodity produced within the defined area will so substantially exceed the 
effective demand for said commodity during the marketing year as to nullify or defeat the 
purposes of this title, said marketing committee, in consultation with the Board and the 
Secretary of Agriculture, shall develop a plan or program of marketing allotment, with or 
without acreage or production limitations, and shall request the Board to submit said plan 
or program by referendum to the producers 9f said commodity within said defined area for 
the approval or rejection of said producers.''~ In essence, this bill would set up controls on 
marketings through acreage or other production controls and then allow for bargaining over 
the price level of the commodity. Our analysis evaluates the production and utilization 
levels, prices and incomes which such a program might provide. 
A second type of program analyzed is long-term land retirement. Envisioned in 
this program are 5 and 1 0-year contracts which would remove land from production and 
return it to grass, trees or other extensive uses. This proposal is evaluated for two alternative 
levels of land retirement, a 50 million-acre program and a 60-million-acre program. By 
removing less productive land on a bid basis, such a ~rogram could provide a means for an 
orderly transfer to a market-oriented economy.~This program could provide the 
mechanism by which government costs could be reduced while the agricultural sector is 
moved toward a long-run self-sustaining balance between supply and demand. 
JJ This bill, often known as the "Mondale Bill," was introduced on February 15, 1968. 
JJ Senate Bill 2973. 90th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 4. 
lJ Ibid. p. 7. 
_M Ibid. p. 19. 
2 This type change in farm policies has been recommended by many individuals and groups 
including the Presidential Advisory Commission on Food and Fiber. For background and 
viewpoints, see the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Food and Fiber, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. July 1967. pp. 15-22 and 66-72. 
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A third alternative examined assumes that present voluntary, direct payment 
programs will continue. It investigates the major outcomes which are likely if present 
programs for wheat, feed grains, and cotton continue. Effects on land use, domestic and 
export demand, commodity prices, farm income and expenses, government payments and 
other variables are evaluated. 
Finally, to provide a basemark against which other programs may be evaluated 
and compared, outcomes with a free market are estimated and reported. This type of a 
market for agriculture would cause the largest change from existing programs. For this 
reason, the effects of a free market are measured in terms of outcomes for the short run, a 
period of only one or two years, and outcomes for the long run, a period at the end of three 
to five years or longer. The projected results differ, depending on whether the industry is in 
the initial stages of adjustment to a free market or whether adjustment to market prices has 
continued for several years. 
Results for all alternative programs are specified in terms of 1970 levels of 
demand, both domestic and export, and in terms of available production capacity which 
takes into consideration the level of technology, costs of production and the present 
structure of agriculture. All prices are measured in terms of 1965-66 dollars and do not take 
into account possible inflation to 1970. 
A Free Market for Agriculture 
A free market would result for agriculture if the federal government terminated 
(1) voluntary production control programs for wheat, feed grains and cotton, and (2) 
removed the offer to purchase and store qylJ,ntities of agricultural commodities in order to 
support prices at some prespecified level..!/ With the removal of production control and 
price support programs, farmers would base all decisions of what to produce, how much to 
produce, and how (what combination of resources to use) to produce it, on price signals 
from the market. Under this situation, price expectations (what the price will be at harvest 
time) become relatively more important. Since there is a considerable tendency among 
agricultural producers to use prices received in the past as estimates of what prices will be in 
the future, the shift from present programs to uncontrolled production will likely result in 
an increase in aggregate production for the following reason: Projecting past farm price 
levels to the end of the next production period, farmers expect gross value of sales to 
increase with the larger quantities which could be produced if government control programs 
were terminated. But past price levels are a function of some particular quantity that moved 
through the market place, and if the quantity brought to the market place is substantially 
increased, price levels will decline. The decline in prices will be substantially greater than the 
liThe purchase and storing of farm commodities need not be terminated completely, rather 
just terminating the offer to purchase at some particular price level would remove price 
supports on these crops. The government could still purchase quantities of the crops at 
market prices and place them in storage so that reserves of food and other crops could 
still be maintained uninterrupted. 
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increase in quantity since demand for major grain crops is inelastic . .U This set of 
circumstances would provide the following initial outcome under a free market: farmers 
would individually increase production basing the expected price at the end of the current 
production season on past prices received. But the larger aggregate quantity when sold in the 
market place would necessarily force down prices in order that the larger quantity be 
utilized. The drop in price would be greater than the increase in quantity sold and total 
returns would be reduced. Since costs of production would remain similar or even increase, 
net returns would decline. 
In the initial production and marketing period, the price decline for crops would 
be considerable. However, livestock prices tend to lag one or more production periods 
behind changes in grain prices and, hence, livestock prices and incomes would be little 
affected during the initial production period. The numerical calculations for the initial 
period under a free market are shown below. 
Short-Term Adjustment to a Free Market 
The initial response of farmers to removal of controls on crop acreages would be 
an increase in acreages planted to crops. The exact magnitude of this increase is difficult to 
project since a large number of crop acres have remained idle under various government 
programs since 1956. In the case of the crop acres in the Conservation Reserve Program, 
some part of the 28 million acres may remain seeded to grass or trees even when the 
program ends. Taking into account this and other uncertainties, acreages of crops are 
projected for 1970 assuming that all government programs are terminated at the end of the 
1969 crop season. The national estimates of crop acreages, yields and production for a free 
market with short-term adjustment are shown in Table 3. These results are reported for the 
United States in aggregate although actual C£Jllputations were completed for each of 150 
major producing regions in the United States . .B 
With a free market in 1970, wheat acreage harvested is projected to increase to 
65.8 million acres, with a national yield of 28.3 bushels per acre and a total production of 
1.8 billion bushels. Feed grain acres increase to an estimated 101 million acres and a total 
production of 180 million tons of feed grains. Yields would initially be relatively low with a 
national corn yield for 1970 estimated at 80.0 bushels per acre. With these levels of 
production for wheat and feed grains, stocks of these grains would rise, wheat by an 
estimated 200 million bushels and feed grains by 12 million tonsll Most of this grain 
1J Price elasticity of demand is defined as the percentage change in quantity demanded 
associated with a percentage change in price. In algebraic form, 
Edp = i ~ ~ 
For feed grains the price elasticity has been estimated at -.25; or for each 1 percent 
increase (decrease) in market supply, price will decline (increase) by 4 percent. Any price 
elasticity of less than 1.0 is referred to as inelastic. 
11 For a detailed description of the procedure and linear programming model used in the 
calculations, see Earl 0. Heady and Leo V. Mayer, "Food Needs and U.S. Agriculture in 
1980." Volume I, Technical Papers, National Advisory Commission on Food and Fiber. 
Washington, D.C., 1967. 
11 Exports of major commodities were projected as follows: Feed grains 32.0 million tons, 
wheat 925 million bushels, soybeans 500 million bushels and cotton 5 million bales. 
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Table l.: Projected 1970 acreages, yields and production for a farm economy after short 
and long-term adjustment to a free market, with prior years for comparison. 
ACTUAL .a/ PROJECTED 1970 
Crop 1961-65 1966 1967 Short-term Long-term 
Average Adjustment Adjustment 
HARVESTED ACREAGES (000) 
Wheat 48,017 49,867 59,004 65,830 64,231 
Feed Grains 101,086 97,812 100,654 101,204 88,924 
Corn 56,658 56,933 60,385 61,554 57,455 
Oats 21,162 17,~61 15,970 16,309 13,949 
Barley 11,135 10,205 9,188 10,383 9,178 
Gr. Sorg. 12,131 12,813 15,111 12,898 8,342 
Soybeans 29,694 36,546 39,742 40,940 39,592 
Cotton 14,617 9,552 8,090 14,315 14,269 
YIELD PER. HA-RVESTED ACRE 
Wheat (bu.) 25.3 26.3 25.8 28.3 28.4 
Corn (bu.) 66.3 72.3 78.2 80.0 85.1 
Oats (bu.) 45.2 44.9 49.0 47.0 53.3 
Barley (bu.) 36.2 38.5 40.3 39.0 44.3 
Gr. Sorg. (bu.) 45.0 55.8 50.7 56.3 61.3 
Soybeans (bu.) 24.2 25.4 24.5 27.2 27.0 
Cotton (lbs.) 491 480 452 506 508 
TOTAL PRODUCTION (000) 
Wheat (bu.) 1,214,024 1,311,702 1,524,349 1,804,707 1,824,160 
Feed Grains (ton) 145,383 157,563 175,054 180,328 172,891 
Corn (bu.) 3,758,389 4,117,355 4,722,164 4,923,081 4,889,588 
Oats (bu.) 953,426 801,327 781,867 776,567 743,175 
Barley (bu.) 398,268 393,186 370,246 405,430 406,982 
Gr. Sorg. (bu.) 547,676 714,992 765,617 725,926 511,565 
Soybeans (bu.) 718,687 928,481 972,701 1,113,157 1,068,869 
Cotton (bales) 14,935 9,575 7,618 14,500 14,500 
~ Actual production data are from Crop Production 1967 Annual Summary 
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Such a large quantity of production would have significant effects on prices of 
grain commodities in the time span of only one or two production periods. In Table 4, 
prices for the initial production season with short-term adjustment to a free market are 
lower than any recently experienced. Wheat price declines to $.85 per bushel and com price 
is $.70 per bushet.1.1 Other feed grains prices are well below recent levels. Soybean price is 
$1.08 per bushel. 
The initial effect of removing all controls and price supports would be to sharply 
reduce the prices of major grains. Indeed, these prices would not cover some major costs of 
producing these grains. In the short-term, price levels are estimated to only cover out of 
pocket costs (seed, fertilizer, and other operating expenses) but would not cover 
depreciation expense, return to operator labor, or other fixed expenses. This level of farm 
prices could only continue for a few production periods since many farmers with high costs 
of production would find it uneconomical to continue production. 
Even in the short-run, these prices would cause farm income to decline rapidly. 
Gross receipts from crops would decline by one to two billion dollars (Table 5). Livestock 
receipts in the initial year would be relatively unaffected since there is a lag of one or more 
ll Prices in this study are based on the estimated costs of producing grain adjusted according 
to the time period projected. For the short-term free market, prices of grain are based 
only on the variable costs of producing grain commodities, i.e. fuel costs, hired labor, 
seed, fertilizer, pesticides, drying and storage costs are included; family labor and 
depreciation costs are not included. This formulation suggest that com price could drop 
to a national average price of $0.70 and wheat to $0.85 per bushel in the short-run and 
that farmers would still market these commodities. An alternative set of prices based on 
estimates of price elasticities of demand and quantities produced were prepared for the 
short-term free market. Those estimates projected a national average com price of $0.65 
and wheat at $0.78 per bushel. These estimates are slightly lower than those adopted for 
this study. However, prices based on production costs assume that the farm structure and 
corresponding cost structure remain constant. As suggested in Figure 23 and by the data 
below, the changing cost structure will effect the price level at which farmers are willing 
to supply a given quantity of a commodity. For the example shown here, the average cost 
data used in this study provided a cost of $0.76 per bushel of com while a shift to the 
cost structure of the large farm would give a cost of $0.70 per bushel. If the latter 
Production costs per acre: Average Farm Large Farm 
Power and Machinery $23.70 $18.11 
Fertilizer and Lime 24.99 24.99 
Labor (family & hired) 8.51 8.51 
Seed, Pesticides & lrr. 3.62 3.62 
Drying, Storage & Int. 4.06 4.06 
Total $64.97 $59.29 
Average yield per acre: 85 bu. 85.bu. 
Average cost per bushel produced: $ 0.76 $ 0.70 
structure should exist by 1970, prices in this study would evidently be overestimated. 
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Table 4. Projected 1970 farm level prices for a farm economy with short and long-term 
adjustment to a free market, with prior years for comparison. 
Commodity Unit ACTUAL PRICES RECEIVED~ PROJECTED 1970 
1961-65 1965 1967 Short-term Long-term 
Average Adjustment Adjustment 
CROP PRICES 
Wheat bu. 1.67 1.35 1.39 .85 1.22 
Corn bu. 1.13 1.16 1.05 .70 .98 
Oats bu. .63 .62 .66 .38 .53 
Barley bu. .95 1.02 1.00 .57 .80 
Gr. Sorg. bu. 1.00 1.00 1.00 .60 .84 
Soybeans bu. 2.46 2.54 2.49 1.08 1.86 
Cotton Lint lb. 30.9 28.1 25.6 26.6 23.2 
LIVESTOCK PRICES 
Cattle lb. 19.8 20.0 22.6 22.0 17.6 
Hogs lb. 16.6 20.6 18.9 18.2 15.8 
Sheep lb. 16.8 20.0 18.9 19.5 19.1 
Broilers lb. 14.6 15.0 13.3 15.3 15.3 
Turkeys lb. 21.2 22.2 19.5 22.5 22.5 
Eggs doz. 37.1 33.7 31.2 35.4 35.4 
Milk cwt. 4.16 4.23 5.02 4.52 4.52 
21 Actual prices received are from Agricultural Prices 1967 Annual Summary June 1968; 
and Livestock and Meat Statistics Supplement for 1967 to Statistical Bulletin No. 233. 
June 1968. 
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Table _2., Farm income by source, farm production expenses and net farm income, actual 
1960-1967 with projected 1970 estimates under a free market after short and long-
term adjustment. 
ACTUAL~ PROJECTED 1970 
1961-65 1965 1967 Short-term Long-term 
Average Adjustment Adjustment 
(million dollars) 
Crop Receipts 16,701 17,392 18,383 15,522 17,453 
Wheat 1,938 1,637 2,066 1,217 1,758 
Feed Grains 2,796 3,125 3,728 2,295 3,048 
Soybeans 1,636 1,812 2,432 1,175 1,858 
Cotton 2,545 2,065 947 1,872 1,826 
Tobacco 1,303 1,186 1,392 1,270 1,270 
Vegetables 2,158 2,559 2,616 2,697 2,697 
Fruits 1,614 1,667 1,746 1,686 1,686 
Other 2,711 3,478 3,456 3,310 3,310 
Livestock Receipts 20,041 21,958 24,405 23,016 21,984 
Meat Animals 11,472 12,964 14,630 12,796 11,994 
Dairy Products 4,126 5,037 5,770 5,512 5,512 
Poultry & Eggs 3,332 3,513 3,559 4,384 4,153 
Other 311 444 446 325 325 
Govt. Payments 1,905 2,463 3,079 401 401 
Wheat Program 295 525 731 0 0 
Feed Grains 1,00312/ 1,391 865 0 0 
Cotton 54 70 932 0 0 
Other 585 477 551 401 401 
Total Cash Receipts 38,807 41,813 45,867 38,939 39,838 
Cash Expenses<;/ 24,533 25,951 29,079 27,467 27,074 
Net Cash Receipts 14,274 15,862 16,788 11,472 12,764 
Depreciation 4,537 4,982 5,741 5,500 5,200 
Actual Cash Income 9,737 10,880 11,047 5,972 7,564 
Farm Perquisitesc1/ 3,168 3,113 3,194 3,350 3,350 
Inventory Change 353 994 403 593 350 
Net Farm Income 13,249 14,987 14,644 9,915 11,264 
.E/ Actual income data are from Farm Income State Estimates 1949-64, A supplement to the 
July 1967 Farm Income Situation, August 1967; and Farm Income Situation, July, 1968. 
J2J 1964-65 ave. 
£.1 Current operating expenses plus taxes, interest, and landlord rent. 
~Value of home consumption and gross rental value of farm dwelling. 
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production periods before livestock production expands to utilize the larger quantities. of 
grain. Government payments would also drop with only those payments for soil 
conservation, wool, and sugar programs remaining. Total cash receipts would total less than 
in recent years while pro1~uction expenses would continue upward, rising partly because of 
expanded crop acreage.1 Net cash recipts would be considerably reduced. Depreciation 
costs continue, however, and actual cash income would be cut in half. Even adding in the 
value of farm prerequisites and inventory changes, neither of which provide spendable 
income, net farm income in the initial period of production would be below any recently 
experienced levels. 
Long-term Adjustment to a Free Market 
Low prices and incomes resulting during the initial period of adjustment to a free 
market would of necessity eventually reduce total production of agricultural commodities. 
While most producers would not reduce their rate of output, producers on cropland with 
marginal earning ability would find it necessary to completely cease production. Those 
ceasing production would be concentrated by communities, specifically in soil and climatic 
regions where yields are relatively low and unstable. While a number of production periods 
would likely be required before production became largely stabilized in relation to demand, 
this period would eventually arrive. By then, producers on marginal cropland in regions with 
relatively high costs of production would have ceased production of major crops. 
The second set of free market estimates presented assumes that these adjustments 
have occurred. Crop production is again stabilized against potential demand, both domestic 
and export at price levels which cover all major costs of production including family and 
hired labor . .Y Domestic demand is increased due to larger purchases of livestock 
commodities at lower price levels. With a free market economy in equilibrium at market 
derived prices, harvested wheat acreage is projected to total 64.2 million acres (Table 3). 
Yields of wheat would be 28.4 bushels per acre and total production 1.8 billion bushels. 
Major increases in utilization '"Ould result during the period of adjustment, however. Wheat 
for feed would increase to 32u million bushels, replacing feed grains in marginal feed grain 
production areas. Feed grain acres are projected to decline partially for this reason but also 
as production tends to concentrate on higher yielding acres in the Corn Belt. Wheat is fed to 
livestock in western areas of the United States. Total feed grain production is 173 million 
tons with an estimated 32 million tons being exported. The remainder is fed to livestock, 
used for seed, industrial or food uses. Soybean acreage might decline slightly, but total 
production would still exceed 1 billion bushels. 
Prices for major grain crops would return to higher levels after an initial depressed 
period of a few years. Wheat price is estimated to stabilize near a long-run level of $1.22 per 
bushel, corn price at slightly less than $1.00 per bushel]/ (Table 4) and soybeans around 
$1.86 per bushel. As livestock production expands to utilize the larger quantities of grain at 
lower prices, livestock prices would slide downward. Beef prices at the farm gate would 
JlFor the methodology used in estimating cash expenses, see the Technical Appendix of 
Farm Program Alternatives by Luther G. Tweeten, Earl 0. Heady and Leo V. Mayer. 
CAED Report No. 18. Iowa State University. May 1963 . 
...YLabor was charged at a projected national farm wage rate of $1.50 per hour for 1970. 
l.!There would be no direct payment of supplement the market price of course. 
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approach 17.6 cents and pork 15.8 cents per pound. Other livestock prices are not projected 
to show any considerable change, although small differences would likely result. JJ 
Farm income would improve slightly once the farm industry had adjusted to a 
free market economy. Crop receipts would increase, but aggregate livestock receipts would 
be somewhat lower as production expanded against an inelastic demand. Government 
payments would remain minimal, thus contributing little to total cash receipts. Cash 
expenses would drop slightly as acreages stabilized at a lower level. Depreciation also would 
be less as fewer farmers purchased additional capital inputs during the initial period of 
adjustment. Both actual cash income and net farm income would increase over the 
short-term result, the latter stabilizing near $11 billion. If, in the adjustment process, 
one-fourth of the farm operators found it necessary to cease farming, net income per farm 
would return to near recent levels although aggregate farm income would be reduced. 
Long-Term Land Retirement Programs 
One of the least restrictive types of government programs for agriculture is one 
which removes all cropland on individual farms from production under a long-term contract. 
This type of program does not restrict individual crop production, but rather reduces acres 
of cropland available for planting of crops. Such a program reduces the size of the land 
input, and if combined with complementary programs, could return less productive 
cropland to grass, trees or other natural states. Such a program would initiate a reversal of 
government policies and programs of the last century which continue to shift additional 
land from a state of low productivity to an advanced state of crop production. 
Programs which continue to shift additional cropland into production compound 
the problem of excess production and raise the cost of controlling total farm output. 
Instead, programs are needed which return land from intensive crop production to extensive 
uses on a long-term basis. Such a program more nearly fills the present need for national 
farm policy. We suggested earlier that the nation's policy toward agriculture has changed as 
economic development occurred. Initially, the policy was of a development nature, geared 
to bring the vast open spaces of the nation under the plow. As land became more scarce, 
developmental policies shifted toward facilitating the use of other inputs-new knowledge 
through research and extension, capital through farm credit acts, electricity through REA, 
fertilizer through TV A and several others. But these very inputs place the nation in a new 
stage of economic development. In this stage, expansion in food production occurs because 
of the invention, mass production and rapid distribution of technological innovations, 
especially through the private sector, rather than as a result of increasing acres of land. 
Technological innovations cause increases in production at a more rapid rate than the 
increase in demand for food. Also, in this stage, population growth provides the major 
source of domestic demand expansion. Income growth has little effect on the demand for 
food. As a result of technological progress, increases in aggregate food demand can easily be 
supplied by the growth of output from a fixed land base, one which is considerably smaller 
than that available at the present time. Thus, in this stage of economic development, a set of 
policies which permanently return cropland to grass and trees is appropriate. The products 
which this land could produce are now in high demand-recreation through national parks 
and wildlife reserves, through golf courses and trails for hiking, biking and horseback riding, 
lumber production to renew a century of accumulated slums and many other items which 
JJ No attempt was made to estimate the effects of a free market on poultry or egg prices. 
Production controls on milk which are outside major government farm programs were 
assumed to continue. 
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could be produced on cropland which is no longer needed for food production. These are 
the kinds of new uses toward which our millions of surplus acres need to be reoriented. But 
present programs do little to facilitate this change. Only a considerable reorientation of 
agricultural programs will tend to bring about this type of outcome. 
One type of program which could start the process of returning land to grass, 
trees and other uses would be a long- term land retirement program. Such a program would 
not in itself provide large tracts of land for recreational uses or the necessary development 
costs but could provide a means to start toward this goal. The program we explore here is 
envisioned as follows: Government contracts for the retirement of cropland would be 
offered on a bid basis with government payments per acre designed to equal net returns 
above total costs of production plus an allowance for mowing or other weed control. In 
addition, a payment would be allowed for establishing grass or other vegetative cover in the 
initial year of each contract. Participation in the program would be limited to a maximum 
of I 0 percent of all cropland in a region in any one year with a maximum of 50 percent of 
total cropland from a region being eligible for entry into the program. The program is 
examined for two alternative levels: the first program retires 50 million acres of cropland; 
the second retires 60 million acres of cropland. Major aspects of the 50 million-acre program 
are discussed first. Both levels suppose land retirement on a whole-farm basis. 
Long-Run Retirement of 50 Million Acres of Cropland 
Under a program oriented toward long-term retirement, the process of 
implementing sized program will require some period of years. We envision a program which 
would continue placing land under contract for a minimum of 5 years, at the end of which 
time the program would total 50 million acres and leave cropland available for the following 
magnitude of major crops: wheat 55.2 million acres, feed grains 85.5 million acres, soybeans 
36.9 million acres and cotton 14.2 million acres (Table 6). 
Yields under this type of program would not differ greatly from those under a 
free market since the distribution of production among states and regions would nearly 
approximate a free market with only the land base reduced by 50 million acres. Under these 
conditions wheat yields 28.7 bushels per acre and corn 86.1 bushels per acre. Soybeans 
average 27 bushels per acre with this program. 
This type program would facilitate the shift of crop acreage toward locations of 
economic advantage. Feed grains and especially corn production would shift toward the 
Corn Belt, wheat toward the Great Plains, especially Kansas and Nebraska. These shifts 
would occur as present controls on production were slowly removed over the initial 5-year 
period while the program built up to a 50 million-acre reserve. In this manner, crop acreage 
would slowly shift to where it could be grown at least cost, and acreage retired from 
production and returned to grass would slowly shift to the marginal areas of the nation. 
With 50 million acres of cropland removed from potential production, prices of 
major commodities would be only slightly above long-term market levels (Table 7). Wheat at 
$1.29 and corn at $1.03 are near market levels of recent years. Soybeans are priced at $2.05 
under these conditions. These prices are estimated as equilibrium prices, and cover all costs 
of production including depreciation and the cost of hired and operator labor. Prices of 
livestock are projected to continue near recent levels since these prices generally reflect 
JJ With farm programs continued a lower set of exports were projected: wheat 850 million 
bushels, feed grains 28.0 million tons, soybeans 450 million bushels and cotton 5.0 
million bales. 
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Table ...§.,_ Project 1970 acreages, yields and production for a farm economy with a 50 million-acre 
land retirement program and a 60 million-acre land retirement program with prior years 
for comparison. 
ACTUAL;/ PROJECTED 1970 
Crop 1961-65 1966 1967 50 Million 60 Million 
Average Acre Prog. Acre Prog. 
HARVESTED ACREAGES (000) 
Wheat 48,017 49,867 59,004 55,233 53,800 
Feed Grains 101,086 97,812 100,654 85,533 83,123 
Corn 56,658 56,933 60,385 54,049 55,136 
Oats 21 '162 17,861 15,970 13,169 11,524 
Barley 11,135 10,205 9,188 8,863 8,248 
Gr. Sorg. 12,131 12,813 15,111 9,452 8,215 
Soybeans 29,694 36,546 39,742 36,907 37,179 
Cotton 14,617 9,552 8,090 14,238 14,232 
YIELD PER HARVESTED ACRE 
Wheat (bu.) 25.3 26.3 25.8 28.7 30.7 
Corn (bu.) 66.3 72.3 78.2 86.1 86.2 
Oats (bu.) 45.2 44.9 49.0 54.1 53.6 
Barley (bu.) 36.2 38.5 40.3 45.3 45.8 
Gr. Sorg. (bu.) 45.0 55.8 50.7 63.2 63.8 
Soybenas (bu.) 24.2 25.4 24.5 27.0 26.8 
Cotton (lbs.) 491 480 452 509 509 
TOTAL PRODUCTION (000) 
Wheat (bu.) 1,214,024 1,311,702 1,524,349 1,584,314 1,652,985 
Feed Grains (ton) 145,383 157,563 175,054 168,105 166,751 
Corn (bu.) 3,758,389 4,117,355 4,722,164 4,655,140 4,754,962 
Oats (bu.) 953,426 801,327 781,867 712,443 617,291 
Barley (bu.) 398,268 393,186 370,246 401,493 377,506 
Gr. Sorg. (bu.) 547,676 714,992 765,617 597,366 524,117 
Soybeans (bu.) 718,687 928,481 972,701 996,374 996,322 
Cotton (bales) 14,935 9,575 7,618 14,500 14,500 
.Ef Actual production data are from Crop Production 1967 Annual Summary. 
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Table 7. Projected 1970 farm level prices for a farm economy with a 50 million acre and a 
60 million acre long-term land retirement program, with prior years for comparison. 
ACTUAL PRICES RECEIVED2f PROJECTED 1970 
Commodity Unit 1961-65 1965 1967 50 Million 60 Million 
Average Acre Prog. Acre Prog. 
CROP PRICES 
Wheat bu. 1.67 1.35 1.39 1.29 1.42 
Corn bu. 1.13 1.16 1.05 1.03 1.13 
Oats bu. .63 .62 .66 .56 .62 
Barley bu. .95 1.02 1.00 .84 .92 
Gr. Sorg. bu. 1.00 1.00 1.00 .88 .97 
Soybeans bu. 2.46 2.54 2.49 2.05 2.38 
Cotton Lint lb. 30.9 28.1 25.6 23.5 23.8 
LIVESTOCK PRICES 
Cattle lb. 19.8 20.0 22.6 22.0 22.0 
Hogs lb. 16.6 20.6 18.9 18.2 18.2 
Sheep lb. 16.8 20.0 18.9 19.5 19.5 
Broilers lb. 14.6 15.0 13.3 15.3 15.3 
Turkeys lb. 21.2 22.2 19.5 22.5 22.5 
Eggs doz. 37.1 33.7 31.2 35.4 35.4 
Milk cwt. 4.16 4.23 5.02 4.52 4.52 
~Actual prices received are from Agricultural Prices 1967 Annual Summary June 1968; 
and Livestock and Meat Statistics Supplement for 1967 to Statistical Bulletin No. 233. 
June 1968. 
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changes in the prices of inputs including grain. Since a majority of grain does not presently 
pass through the market place, a large part of livestock production is based on grain priced 
according to its cost of production. This cost would not change greatly under a change in 
types of government programs and, hence livestock prices would tend to continue near 
present levels.l/ 
Income levels are higher than free market levels with the continuation of farm 
programs although the 50 million- acre land retirement program is estimated to provide less 
net farm income than in recent years (Table 8). Our estimates project net farm income to 
stabilize near $12.6 billion if present government programs of supply control and price 
support are terminated and a long-term land retirement program removed 50 million acres 
of cropland from production. Crop receipts would decline from recent levels because greater 
output fails to offset the lower prices which prevail. Livestock receipts increase from recent 
averages due mainly to an increase in quantities produced. Prices for livestock in 1970 are 
projected to deviate little from present levels and, hence, receipts change about in 
proportion to quantities produced. 
Government payments for all direct payment programs total $1.3 billion with the 
long-term land retirement program for wheat, feed grains and cotton totaling $857 million. 
This cost of land retirement would provide payments on 50 million acres equal to present 
net returns per acre plus a payment for mowing or other form of weed control. An 
additional cost of establishing grass or trees would be incurred during the initial year of each 
contract. This grass establishment cost would be over and above the annual cost and is 
estimated to range from $5 to $1 0 per acre. 
In table 9, we provide a breakdown of the land retirement programs by regions of 
the United States. Under the 50 million-acre program, the average cost is $17.09 per acre. 
Location of acreage retired was derived through the principle that the least productive acres 
in each region would be retired under this program . .Y Using this principle, the largest 
acreage is located in the Northern Plains with the Southern Plains and Com Belt also 
retiring a considerable number of acres. For the 50, 17 6,000 acres retired, the cost would 
total $857 million dollars annually. As is evident from Table 8, recent government payments 
for the programs of land retirement have cost considerably more than this. The cost of this 
program would rise if the acres are increased. The next alternative indicates the magnitude 
of increase. 
Long-Run Retirement of 60 Million Acres of Cropland 
Enlarging the program of land retirement by an additional 10 million acres has 
several effects: acreages of major crops are generally reduced; however, removal of 
additional marginal acreage causes yields to increase for some crops (Table 6). This is 
particularly true of wheat where removal of additional cropland in the Great Plains causes 
the average yield for the U.S. to rise. As the cropland base is reduced, prices of all 
commodities rise with wheat priced at $1.42 per bushel and com at $1.13 per bushel (Table 
7). Soybean prices increase to $2.38 per bushel. These price levels are near those of recent 
years, although below 1966, which was one of the better years fmancially for U.S. farmers. 
11 Over a period of time, livestock priceswould 1ikelyshiftto reflect theopportunity costof 
selling or feeding grain. We have not attempted to determine what the change would be 
for programs where the change is relatively small. 
1J Acres retired in any region was limited to 50 percent of the cropland base. 
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Table 8. Farm income by source, farm production expenses and net farm income, actual 1960-1967 
with projected 1970 estimates under two alternative levels of a long-term land retirement 
program. 
Source ACTUALW PROJECTED 1970 
of 1961-65 1965 1967 50 Million 60 Million 
Income Average Acre Prog. Acre Prog. 
(million dollars) 
Crop Receipts 16,701 17,392 18,383 17,693 18,412 
Wheat 1,938 1,637 2,066 1,871 1,946 
Feed Grains 2,796 3,125 3,728 3,099 3,382 
Soybeans 1,636 1,812 2,432 1,908 2,215 
Cotton 2,545 2,065 947 1,852 1,906 
Tobacco 1,303 1,186 1,392 1,270 1,270 
Vegetables 2,158 2,559 2,616 2,697 2,697 
Fruits 1,614 1,667 1,746 1,686 1,686 
Other 2,711 3,478 3,456 3,310 3,310 
Livestock Receipts 20,041 21,958 24,405 23,016 23,016 
Meat Animals 11,472 12,964 14,630 12,796 12,796 
Dairy Products 4,126 5,037 5,770 5,512 5,512 
Poultry & Eggs 3,332 3,513 3,559 4,383 4,383 
Other 311 444 446 325 325 
Govt. Payments 1,905 2,463 3,079 1,258 1,784 
Wheat Program 295 525 731 
Feed Grains 1,0~~ 1,391 865 857 1,383 Cotton 70 932 
Other 585 477 551 401 401 
Total Cash Receipts 38,807 41,813 45,867 41,697 43,212 
Cash Expenses£/ 24,533 25,951 29,079 27,248 27,403 
Net Cash Receipts 14,274 15,862 16,788 14,449 15,809 
Depreciation 4,537 4,982 5,741 5,500 5,500 
Actual Cash Income 9,737 10,880 11,047 8,949 10,309 
Farm Perquisites41 3,168 3,113 3,194 3,350 3,350 
Inventory Change 353 994 403 350 350 
Net Farm Income 13,249 14,987 14,644 12,649 14,009 
~ Actual income data are from Farm Income State Estimates 1949-64, A supplement to the 
July 1967 Farm Income Situation, August 1967; and Farm Income Situation, July 1968. 
Jl/ 1964-65 ave. 
f1 Current operating expenses plus taxes, interest, and landlord rent. 
s!f Value of home consumption and gross rental value of farm dwelling. 
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Table 9. Land retirement costs, acres retired and costs per acre broken down by the 10 farm 
production regions of the United States for two alternative levels of a long-term land 
retirement program. 
50 MILLION ACRES 60 MILLION ACRES 
Acres Annual Cj}st Annual Acres Annual~st Annual 
Retired Per Acre Total Cost Retired Per Acre Total Cost 
(000) ($) (000) (000) ($) (000) 
United States 50,176 17.09 857,334 60,046 23.03 1,382,741 
Northeast 2,312 14.11 32,622 2,447 19.25 47,105 
Lake States 4,730 17.28 81,734 5,373 22.07 118,582 
Corn Belt 6,702 22.37 149,924 10,048 33.89 340,527 
N. Plains 13,534 16.99 229,943 16,084 21.18 340,659 
Appalachians 3,658 14.64 53,553 3,679 19.69 72,440 
Southeast 4,487 15.13 67,888 4,818 19.63 94,577 
Delta 2,432 17.04 41,441 2,870 25.37 72,812 
S. Plains 7,409 15.54 115,136 8,785 19.14 168,145 
Mountain 3,809 15.50 59,040 4,424 19.33 85,516 
Pacific 1,103 23.62 26,053 1,518 27.93 42,398 
1J Annual cost per acre is the estimated annual net return per acre from crop production 
plus a $5 per acre allowance for mowing or other form of weed control. In addition, there 
would be an additional cost in the initial year of each contract for establishment of grass, 
trees or other vegetative cover. 
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With higher prices for crops, farm income also increases over the 50 million acre 
retirement program. Crop receipts rise by nearly a billion dollars and government program 
payments increase with the larger program (Table 8). Total cash receipts rise by nearly $1.6 
billion with some small increase in cash expenses. Net farm income rises to $14.0 billion 
under the larger land retirement program. 
In Table 9, cost of the 60 million-acre land retirement program is broken down by 
the 10 farm production regions. With higher crop prices, the average cost per acre retired 
rises to $23.03 and annual program costs total $1.4 billion. The increase in cost is due to 
increased net returns per crop acres which higher crop prices bring. As net returns from 
farming increase for each crop acre, the cost for bidding the land out of production and into 
retirement also increases. If the program was expanded to even a higher level, the cost would 
rise still further. 
The 60 million acre retirement plan would provide a net income for agriculture in 
aggregate at about the 1967 level. However, its cost would be less than half as much as the 
1968 program. The method could, of course, be used to take net farm income to a higher 
level than the $14 billion indicated. However, the number of acres retired and the costs of 
the program also would increase. 
Land Retirement and Rural Communities 
Besides having considerable effects on farm production and prices and incomes, 
concentrated land retirement programs also have many implications for rural communities. 
Land retirement programs which retire marginal land on a whole-farm basis have a tendency 
to concentrate their effects in particular locations. This tendency toward concentration 
arises because of many factors: one is that land in some areas of the nation has been 
cultivated for a longer period of time and is less productive. Also, however, the climate of 
various regions has considerable effect on productivity of soils. Many areas of the Great 
Plains tends toward aridity and certain sections of this region would return to grass under a 
marginal land retirement program. All major farm regions have some land which would be 
offered for retirement under this type of program. But regions with large numbers of 
marginal acres would be most affected by such a program. 
To establish a basis for evaluating some of the effects on rural communities of a 
program which removes up to 50 percent of the cropland from crop production, we use two 
regions in the Northern Plains which partially provide data for a type of "before and after" 
analysis. An 11-county area located in Nebraska represents extensive type farming with 
livestock production on pasture and range as the major farming activity. This region, largely 
restrained by soil and climatic conditions, already has a community and farming structure 
based on extensive-type farm operations with present levels of agricultural technology. A 
second 13-county area, located in South Dakota, is a more general farming area with 
considerable crop and livestock production. In this particular area, research on interregional 
competition consistently suggests that crop production is marginal. Further, the 
Conservation Reserve Program of the 1950's, also on a bid and voluntary basis, retired a 
large acreage of land in this particular region. If a land retirement program were instituted 
on a bid basis to remove marginal land from production, our results suggest that this region 
would participate up to the maximum rate. Up to 50 percent of the present cropland might 
be placed in the program, and unless there were restrictions on participation, even a larger 
proportion of land would gravitate into retirement. The two regions are indicated in Figure 
24. 
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FIGURE 24 
Our supposition is that under a program which removes large acreages of cropland 
from production and returns it to grass, Area II would slowly shift, to an extent consistent 
with the soils and climate of this area--conditions differing somewhat from Area I, toward a 
structure of agriculture now existing in Area I. While this shift would be slow and require at 
least a decade, the changes implied are considerable. In Table 10, data for the two areas 
show that, in terms of land area, the two areas are of similar size and total land in farms is 
nearly equal. But here, importantly because of different natural conditions, the similarities 
of the two regions end. Area I has 15.3 percent of its farmland in crops; Area II has 45.7 
percent in crops. Area I has 81.7 percent of its farmland in pasture, over 7 million acres; 
Area II has 38.0 percent of farmland in pasture. These differences in land use cause a sharp 
difference in numbers of farms; Area II, in South Dakota, had almost 4 times as many farms 
in 1964 as did Area I. 
The similar size of land area but fewer farms causes Area I to have more acres per 
farm. Total farm size in Area I exceeds 3,500 acres while Area II has 906 acres per farm. 
Of additional importance is the set of implications arising from the size of 
population and the number of towns in these areas. Less than one-fourth as many people 
live in the extensive farming area as in the general farming area. Of these, about the same 
proportion of people live on farms, 30 to 35 percent in both regions. There is also a large 
difference in the number of towns and communities which each farming base supports. Area 
I has 41 towns while Area II has 81 towns. Area I has 2 towns over 1 ,000 population; Area 
II has 7. Area I has 1 town above 2,500 population and Area II has 3 such towns. 
The explanation for the difference in structure of towns and population is found 
in the cash flows which the farming operations create in each of the areas. Cash receipts in 
Area I were $50.9 million in 1964, the date of the last Census of Agriculture. Area II 
receipts were twice this, $115.0 million. Cash expenditures by farmers were also twice as 
great in Area II. The machinery inventory, indicating past expenditures for large capital 
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Table 10. Major economic characteristics and their magnitudes underlying the economies 
of two Great Plain farming areas. 
Economic 11 County Area 13 County Area 
Characteristic Unit in Nebraska in South Dakota 
(AREA I) (AREA II) 
Total Land Area acre 9,011,840 8,576,640 
Land in farms acre 8,583,681 8,238,881 
Land in crops acre 1,311,228 3,762,216 
% of farmland pet. 15.3 45.7 
Land in pasture acre 7,009,148 3,129,920 
%of farmland pet. 81.7 38.0 
Number of Farms no. 2,448 8,602 
Average farm size acre 3,506 958 
Average farm sales dol. 20,789 13,372 
Crops sold dol. 561 4,140 
Livestock sold dol. 20,222 9,232 
Total Population no. 23,795 108,782 
Persons on farms no. 8,778 34,366 
%on farms pet. 36.9 31.6 
Number of Towns no. 41 81 
Under 1,000 pop. no. 38 71 
1,000-2,500 pop. no. 2 7 
Over 2,500 pop. no. 1 3 
Total Cash Receipts dol. 50,886,412 115,025,330 
Crop receipts dol. 1,374,186 35,584,189 
Livestock receipts dol. 49,504,186 79,379,837 
Specified Cash Costs dol. 24,675,393 52,579,292 
Livestock purchased dol. 8,945,002 18,528,518 
Feed purchased dol. 7,774,235 11,149,385 
Gasoline purchased dol. 329,215 10,842,236 
Hired labor dol. 3,797,545 4,493,689 
Machine hired dol. 599,961 3,548,380 
Seed purchased dol. 230,085 2,806,097 
Fertilizer bought dol. 230,085 1,300,987 
Machinery Inventory 
Automobiles no. 3,505 11,609 
Motor trucks no. 3,767 12,611 
Tractors no. 8,500 23,432 
Livestock Inventory 
Cattle & calves no. 736,371 846,977 
Hogs & pigs no. 26,647 233,521 
Sheep & lambs no. 12,143 269,261 
Sources: Total land area and total population data are from the 1960 Census of Population. 
All data relating to agriculture are from the 1964 Census of Agriculture for each 
respective state and county. 
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items, indicates large difference in farmer expenditures. Area I had 8,500 tractors on hand 
while Area II had 23,432. Automobiles and motor trucks were in a similar ratio for the two 
areas. 
Livestock inventories also help explain the difference in magnitude of cash 
receipts for the two areas. Area I generally has fewer livestock, mainly those kinds which use 
pasture resources. Area II apparently fed the grain which it raised to a larger number of 
animals, especially hogs. These differences led to livestock recipts of $49.5 million in Area I 
versus $79.4 million for Area II in 1964. 
The evidence presented above, while not for exactly parallel communities, 
because of some differences in natural endowments represented in soils and climate, helps 
explain why previous programs to retire marginal land have not received wide support by 
the nonfarm public in rural areas. These groups tend to lose economically under such 
programs. Under this type of program, landowners or operators receive the equivalent net 
return on each area of cropland and can be as well or better off than before. Closing down 
their farming operations, with compensation for doing so, they can migrate occupationally 
and geographically to employment opportunities which provide a supplemental source of 
income. Older operators can simply retire. But with the land out of production the picture 
differs for local businesses. Purchases of machines, gasoline, seed and fertilizer decline 
greatly. Local communities feel a sharp drop in farm input sales and cash receipts. There 
results an increase in the rate of business terminations, dislocation of proprietors and their 
families and a decline in local employment opportunities. 
But it should not be forgotten that these trends and outcomes also are present 
and occurring under the present programs where only a few acres of land on each farm are 
removed from production. The process of farm structural change, while rapid as compared 
to previous decades, is currently proceeding but at a slower rate than would exist in a 
program of the type outlined above. Even if we continue current programs for another 15 
years at $3 billion annually, we will end up with fewer local towns, churches, schools, 
business units and job opportunities. However, unless some change is made in programs, the 
same number of crop acres will still be available for crop farming and as a potential source 
of surpluses. The funds will have been paid out but the same farm problem will exist even 
though the farm population and the rural community sector have declined greatly. Thus, 
we can go on temporarily holding cropland out of production on a short-term basis, perhaps 
until an urban Congress finally tires of an unending program and eliminates major control 
programs. The resulting free market would remove this marginal land in 5 or so years, either 
turning it into wasteland, or, where the landlord could afford it, into grass or trees. The 
period 1970 to 1975 can be better used for transitional programs which begin to shift this 
land on a long-run basis and in a manner which minimizes the costs to all relevant groups in 
the rural community. Sooner or later without growth in exports beyond that now 
forseen,l/ and with government help or without, this shift is the eventual prospect. 
ll For estimates of future overcapacity in world grain production, see Abel, Martin D. and 
Anthony S. Rojko. "World Food Situation, Prospects for World Grain Production, 
Consumption and Trade. U.S. Department of Agriculture. Foreign Agricultural Economic 
Report No. 35. Washington, D.C. August 1967. Abel and Rojko project an excess world 
grain production in 1980 of 30.1 million metric tons with continue historical trends in 
production, 38.9 million tons with moderate improvement in production, and 62.8 
million metric tons with rapid improvement in production. The authors suggest that the 
"United States therefore has much to gain by getting other developed countries to share 
the supply management burden." (p. 27). 
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Present Programs Continued 
With the 4-year extension of the feed grain program in 1965, Congress set a 
precedent of extending what was initially termed emergency legislation, into apparent 
long-tenn legislation. With later extensions of both the wheat and cotton programs, these 
major programs have been extended until 1970. Each of these programs will terminate in 
1970 or soon after unless Congress acts to extend the program for an additional period of 
time. For a number of reasons explained above, a shift to a longer term program, which (1) 
is more appropriate to the present stage of economic development and the technological 
structure of agriculture, and (2) moves the industry toward a self-initiating balance between 
production and utilization, would be preferable. However, in the event that present 
programs do appeal to a majority of the members of Congress, we evaluate the potential 
effects of continuing these programs into the 1970's. 
Earlier in the study, we traced the historical trends in acreages used for major 
crops. In each case, acreages harvested were shown to be declining. Wheat acreage harvested 
(except for 1967 when stocks were built up) has consistently been 10 to 15 million acres 
below the early 1950's. Feed grain acreage harvested has fallen 25 to 30 million acres since 
the Korean War period, and cotton has declined some 10 to 15 million acres during this 
period. Only soybeans have increased acreage but even this crop now appears to be building 
up surpluses. 
As other crops preceded soybeans into a surplus market situation, acreage 
available for harvest was reduced through government programs. Acreage retired under 
government programs started in 1956, increased to 28.6 million acres in 1960 and rose to 60 
million acres in 1966. Of this latter acreage, the wheat feed grain and cotton programs 
retired over 46 million acres. Total cost for these three programs was $2.7 billion in direct 
government payments.ll 
The cost of these programs will increase if they are extended past 1970. For one 
reason, the Conservation Reserve Program which presently holds nearly 10 million acres out 
of production will terminate during this period. If at least half of this land returns to 
production, and additonal 5 million acres will become available for crop production. For a 
second reason, our estimates suggest that fewer acres of cropland will be needed for crop 
production for major crops in 1970 than in recent years, thus continuing the downtrend in 
cropland required for domestic and export uses. 
In Table 11, we present estimates of cropland required for all major crops in 1970 
under continuation of present programs. A major decrease occurs in acreage of cropland 
used for feed grains. Our results suggest that total acreage required to balance projected 
demand will decline by some 10 million acres compared to 1966 and 1967. Wheat acreage 
may fairly well hold its own, totaling an estimated 53.3 million acres. Soybeans taper off 
from a high of 39.7 million acres in 1967 to 37.5 million acres in 1970. Cotton will 
apparently use more acres and approximate the 1961-65 average of 14.6 million acres}J 
JJThese are the total direct payments made to producers under these programs. Under the 
wheat program, millers are required to purchase certificates from the government for that 
portion of wheat being sold into the domestic market. Thus, actual government costs 
would be somewhat less than this amount. 
1J Export levels assumed were: wheat 850 million bushels, feed grains 28.0 million tons, 
soybeans 450 million bushels, and cotton 5 million bales. 
-48-
Table l.L_ Projected 1970 acreages, yields and production for a farm economy with a feed 
grain-wheat-cotton program, with prior years for comparison. 
ACTUALili' PROJECTED 
Crop 1961-65 
Average 
1966 1967 1970 
HARVESTED ACREAGES (000) 
Wheat 48,017 49,876 59,004 53,279 
Feed Grains 101,086 97,812 100,654 87,158 
Com 56,658 56,933 60,385 55,286 
Oats 21,162 17,861 15,970 12,731 
Barley II, 135 10,205 9,188 9,793 
Gr. Sorg. 12,131 12,813 15,111 9,348 
Soybeans 29,694 36,546 39,742 37,515 
Cotton 14,617 9,552 8,090 14,219 
YIELD PER HARVESTED ACRE 
Wheat (bu.) 25.3 26.3 25.8 29.7 
Com (bu.) 66.3 72.3 78.2 85.4 
Oats (bu.) 45.2 44.9 49.0 51.1 
Barley (bu.) 36.2 38.5 40.3 43.2 
Gr. Sorg. (bu.) 54.0 55.8 50.7 59.3 
Soybeans (bu.) 24.2 25.4 24.5 26.6 
Cotton (lbs.) 491 480 452 510 
TOTAL PRODUCTION (000) 
Wheat (bu.) 1,214,024 1,311,702 1,524,349 1,580,377 
Feed Grains (ton) 145,383 157,563 175,054 168,343 
Com (bu.) 3,758,389 4,117,355 4,722,164 4,721,424 
Oats (bu.) 953,426 801,327 781,867 650,554 
Barley (bu.) 398,268 393,186 370,246 423,058 
Gr. Sorg. 547,676 714,992 765,617 556,471 
Soybeans (bu.) 718,687 928,481 972,701 997,864 
Cotton (bales) 14,935 9,575 7,618 14,500 
~ Actual production data are from Crop Production 1967 Annual Summary. 
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The above estimates assume that government programs similar to the present will 
continue to hold crop production near utilization. Given this assumption, crop prices will 
continue near recent levels. Wheat price received by farmers is estimated at $1.49 per bushel 
and corn price averages $1.23 (Table 12). JJ Soybeans would taper off slightly to near $2.40 
per bushel unless price supports are maintained at a higher level in which case surpluses of 
soybeans will likely grow. Cotton price is estimated at 24.7 cents per pound of lint. With the 
continuation of present programs, livestock prices are projected to continue at near present 
levels: cattle and calves at 22 cents per pound; hogs at 18.2 cents; and sheep and lambs at 
19.5 cents per pound. 
Farm income (Table 13) totals $15.4 billion under the above assumption. Crop 
receipts are projected to total $1.9 billion, livestock $23.0 billion, and government 
payments $3.5 billion. Total cash receipts are estimated at $45.0 billion with cash expenses 
of $27.9 billion, leaving net cash receipts of $17.2 billion. Allowing for depreciation 
expense, actual cash income totals $11.7 billion. With prerequisites and changes in farm 
inventories added in, net farm income totals $15.4 billion. With a continue decline in the 
number of farms, average income per farm would improve. 
Our estimates suggest that ·government costs for land retirement will continue to 
increase if present programs are extended. In Table 14, land retirement costs for the present 
wheat, feed grain and cotton programs are estimated for 1970 by assuming that present 
costs per acre' for land diversion will increase as yields increase and that price support 
payments in 1970 are at the same level as in 1966. If diversion costs, (i.e. yields) should 
increase at more rapid rates or price supports should be raised, actual costs will be above 
these estimates. 
In total, the three programs-wheat; feed grain and cotton-retire approximately 
53.5 million acres, scattered over all producing regions on a partial farm basis (as compared 
to the regional and whole-farm retirement schemes outlined above for both 50 and 60 
million acres) in 1970 at a total cost of $2.8 billion. In addition, the current Cropland 
Adjustment Program which held 4.1 million acres out of production in 1967 is projected to 
increase to 8.0 million acres by 1970. This additional cost will cause total land retirement 
costs to exceed $3 billion. Between these programs, a total of 61.5 million acres of cropland 
will be held out of production. Of this acreage only a small part, the 8 million acres under 
the Cropland Adjustment Program, would likely remain out of production past the 
expiration date of the annual contract. 
We conclude that continuing present short-term programs of land retirement 
provides no mechanisms or means for reducing the program cost over time. Instead, as 
technology raises yields at faster rates than demand increases, total acres retired will 
necessarily have to increase. The cost of these temporary programs will continue to increase 
year after year unless there is a change to programs which permanently return land to other 
extensive uses. Such a change seems particularly appropriate for the 1970's in view of the 
small possibility that 50 million acres of currently retired cropland will be required for crop 
production in the next decade. 
JJ These are the market prices which are necessary if all costs of production are to be 
covered in marginal areas of production, including family and hired labor at $1.50 per 
hour. If producers accept the direct payment under this program partially to cover 
production costs, a greater quantity marketed may cause lower market prices to exist. 
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Table ll: Projected 1970 farm level prices for a farm economy with a feed grain-wheat-cott0n 
program, with prior years for comparison. 
ACTUAL PRICES RECEIVED~ PROJECTED 
Commodity Unit 1961-65 1965 1967 1970 
Average 
CROP PRICES 
Wheat bu. 1.67 1.35 1.39 1.49 
Corn bu. 1.13 1.16 1.05 1.23 
Oats bu. .63 .62 .66 .67 
Barley bu. .95 1.02 1.00 1.00 
Gr. Sorg. bu. 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.05 
Soybeans bu. 2.46 2.54 2.49 2.39 
Cotton Lint lb. 30.9 28.1 25.6 24.7 
LIVESTOCK PRICES 
Cattle lb. 19.8 20.0 22.6 22.0 
Hogs lb. 16.6 20.6 18.9 18.2 
Sheep lb. 16.8 20.0 18.9 19.5 
Broilers lb. 14.6 15.0 13.3 15.3 
Turkeys lb. 21.2 22.2 19.5 22.5 
Eggs doz. 37.1 33.7 31.2 35.4 
Milk cwt. 4.16 4.23 5.02 4.52 
Ef Actual prices received are from Agricultural Prices 1967 Annual Summary June 1968; 
and Livestock and Meat Statistics Supplement for 1967 to Statistical Bulletin No. 233. 
June 1968. 
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Table 13. Farm income by source, farm production expenses and net farm income, actual 
1960-1967 with projected 1970 estimates under a feed grain-wheat-cotton program 
similar to existing programs. 
Source 
ACTUAL.;/ of PROJECTED 
Income 1961-65 1965 1967 1970 
Average 
(million dollars) 
Crop Receipts 16,701 17,392 18,383 18,906 
Wheat 1,938 1,637 2,066 2,039 
Feed Grains 2,796 3,125 3,728 3,699 
Soybeans 1,636 1,812 2,432 2,228 
Cotton 2,545 2,065 947 1,977 
Tobacco 1,303 1,186 1,392 1,270 
Vegetables 2,158 2,559 2,616 2,697 
Fruits 1,614 1,667 1,746 1,686 
Other 2,711 3,478 3,456 3,310 
Livestock Receipts 20,041 21,958 24,405 23,016 
Meat Animals 11,472 12,964 14,630 12,796 
Dairy Products 4,126 5,037 5,770 5,512 
Poultry & Eggs 3,332 3,513 3,559 4,383 
Other 311 444 446 325 
Govt. Payments 1,905 2,463 3,079 3,349 
Wheat Program 295 525 731 824 
Feed Grains 1,003 1,391 865 1,573 
Cotton 54Q/ 70 932 423 
Other 585 477 551 529 
Total Cash Receipts 38,807 41,813 45,867 45,271 
Cash Expenses£/ 24,533 25,951 29,079 27,880 
Net Cash Receipts 14,274 15,862 16,788 17,391 
Depreciation 4,537 4,982 5,741 5,500 
Actual Cash Income 9,737 10,880 11,047 II ,891 
Farm Perquisites<!/ 3,168 3,113 3,194 3,350 
Inventory Change 353 994 403 350 
Net Farm Income 13,249 14,987 14,644 15,591 
W Actual income data are from Farm Income State Estimates 1949-64, A supplement to the 
July 1967 Farm Income Situation, August 1967; and Farm Income Situation, July 1968. 
Q/ 1964-65 ave. 
fi Current operating expenses plus taxes, interest, and landlord rent. 
~ Value of home consumption and gross rental value of farm dwelling. 
Ta
bl
e 
14
. 
A
cr
ea
ge
s d
iv
er
te
d 
an
d 
to
ta
l p
ay
m
en
ts
 re
qu
ire
d 
fo
r c
o
n
tin
ua
tio
n 
o
f t
he
 p
re
se
nt
 w
he
at
, f
ee
d 
gr
ai
ns
 a
n
d 
c
o
tt
on
 p
ro
gr
am
s 
to
 1
97
0.!
!1
 
W
he
at
 
Fe
ed
 G
ra
in
 
C
ot
to
n 
W
he
at
 
Fe
ed
 G
ra
in
 
C
ot
to
n 
R
eg
io
n 
Pr
og
ra
m
 
·
pr
og
ra
m
 
Pr
og
ra
m
 
To
ta
l 
Pr
og
ra
m
 
Pr
og
ra
m
 
Pr
og
ra
m
 
To
ta
l 
D
iv
er
sio
n 
D
iv
er
sio
n 
D
iv
er
sio
n 
Pa
ym
en
ts
 
Pa
ym
en
ts
 
Pa
ym
en
ts
 
(T
HO
US
AN
D 
A
CR
ES
) 
(T
HO
US
AN
D 
D
O
LL
A
RS
) 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 
10
,1
34
 
40
,6
41
 
2,
75
0 
53
,5
25
 
82
3,
94
2 
1,
57
2,
72
8 
42
3,
20
0 
2,
81
9,
87
0 
N
or
th
ea
st
 
29
5 
91
4 
0 
1,
20
9 
13
,3
96
 
39
,4
39
 
0 
52
,8
35
 
La
ke
 S
ta
te
s 
37
9 
3,
87
6 
0 
4,
25
5 
26
,8
60
 
17
2,
83
1 
0 
19
9,
69
1 
C
om
 B
el
t 
92
7 
9,
36
8 
47
 
10
,3
42
 
78
,2
85
 
51
6,
55
2 
7,
00
9 
60
1,
84
6 
N
or
th
er
n 
Pl
ai
ns
 
3,
78
9 
9,
41
3 
0 
13
,2
02
 
35
2,
45
3 
31
4,
01
8 
0 
66
6,
47
1 
v. N I 
A
pp
al
ac
hi
an
s 
43
6 
3,
38
7 
16
3 
3,
98
6 
12
,6
66
 
14
6,
04
7 
20
,0
12
 
17
8,
72
5 
So
ut
he
as
t 
22
8 
3,
57
9 
41
7 
4,
22
4 
5,
71
4 
11
1,
55
7 
42
,6
22
 
I 5
9,
89
3 
D
el
ta
 
46
 
1,
60
7 
60
5 
2,
25
8 
4,
07
3 
40
,7
05
 
97
,6
57
 
14
2,
43
5 
So
ut
he
rn
 P
la
in
s 
2,
05
2 
6,
09
1 
1,
33
9 
9,
48
2 
13
6,
93
0 
17
5,
17
7 
19
7,
59
3 
50
9,
70
0 
M
ou
nt
ai
n 
1,
49
2 
1,
68
9 
10
1 
3,
28
2 
12
9,
61
0 
38
,5
77
 
24
,1
51
 
19
2,
33
8 
Pa
ci
fic
 
49
0 
71
7 
78
 
1,
28
5 
63
,9
55
 
17
,8
25
 
34
, l
 56
 
11
5,
93
6 
.
ill. 
U
nd
er
 p
re
se
nt
 p
ro
gr
am
s 
to
ta
l 
pa
ym
en
ts
 a
re
 c
o
m
pr
is
ed
 o
f p
ric
e 
su
pp
or
t 
(ce
rti
fic
ate
) a
n
d 
di
ve
rs
io
n 
pa
ym
en
ts
. T
he
 1
97
0 
pa
ym
en
ts
 w
er
e 
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
 a
s 
fo
llo
w
s: 
(i)
 W
he
at
 a
n
d 
fe
ed
 g
ra
in
 p
ro
gr
am
s 
-
th
e 
ce
rt
ifi
ca
te
 o
r 
pr
ic
e 
su
pp
or
t p
ay
m
en
t p
er
 
ac
re
 is
 a
ss
u
m
ed
 to
 e
qu
al
 1
96
6 
pa
ym
en
ts
. D
iv
er
te
d 
ac
re
 p
ay
m
en
ts
 fo
r 
19
70
 ar
e 
ba
se
d 
o
n
 1
96
6 
pa
ym
en
ts
 a
dju
ste
d u
pw
ar
d 
fo
r 
pr
oje
cte
d y
ie
ld
 in
cr
ea
se
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
19
66
 a
n
d 
19
70
; (
ii)
 C
ot
to
n 
pr
og
ra
m
 -
pa
ym
en
ts
 u
n
de
r 
th
e 
c
o
tt
on
 p
ro
gr
am
 w
er
e 
c
o
m
pu
te
d 
di
ff
er
en
tly
. T
he
 p
ric
e 
su
pp
or
t 
pa
ym
en
t w
as
 c
al
cu
la
te
d 
a
t 
$.
06
0 p
er
 p
ou
nd
 o
n
 t
he
 p
ro
jec
ted
 pr
od
uc
tio
n 
fro
m
 
th
e 
pr
ic
e 
su
pp
or
t a
cr
es
. 
Th
e 
di
ve
rs
io
n 
pa
ym
en
t w
as
 c
o
m
pu
te
d 
a
t 
$.0
74
 pe
r p
ou
nd
 o
n
 th
e 
pr
oje
cte
d p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
fro
m
 th
e 
di
ve
rte
d 
ac
re
ag
e. 
-53-
Bargaining Power Through Acreage Quotas 
The concept of fanners providing self-imposed programs to improve terms of 
trade with the rest of the economy has long appealed to many farm groups and farm leaders. 
The idea is quite simple: fanners would select a group of representative leaders who would 
then determine the appropriate quantities of agricultural commodities which can be offered 
for sale and still maintain "a fair and reasonable price to the producers thereof." The latest 
legislative proposal defined this price as including "(I) the direct cost of production 
including hired labor; (2) the reasonable value of the time, skill, and experience of the 
individual producing commodity or commodities; (3) a fair return upon essential invested 
capital: (4) continuation of the American family farm pattern of agricultural production; 
and (5) other appropriate factors including compensation comvarable with that of other 
persons engaged in other means of earning a livelihood . . . "JJ The proposal does not 
include a statement about the size of farm or quantity of output which a producer would 
have to sell to earn this level of income, although this is an essential component since price 
alone provides no indication of income level. Size is important because, as illustrated in 
Figure 23 (from data of Iowa record- keeping farms, mainly family units of different sizes) 
the cost of producing a dollar of output varied from$.89 on 160-acrefanns down to $.59 
on 600-acre farms in 1966.1J A "fair and reasonable price" on the small farm thus would be 
considerably higher than for a larger farm. These differences in costs among family farms 
provide a basis for debate over the level of price which reflects "a fair and reasonable price." 
Setting aside some of the problems which will face any fanner committee 
authorized to conduct discussion on bargaining power, we analyzed the effects of 
implementing acreage controls or production limitations on major agricultural commodities. 
The analysis included livestock price levels similar to those which are currently proposed as 
goals by fanner bargaining groups. A major step was to determine the effect which such 
prices would have on to.tal utilization of major commodities. After determining the 
quantities of major crops which would be needed under the assum~d price levels, we 
estimated the acreages of cropland required for each of the major crops.J/ The estimates are 
bases on projected 1970 yields which assume continued improverr ~nt in levels of 
technology with the existing structure of the agricultural industry. 
The results suggest that to satisfy the expected levels of demand associated with 
the higher price levels, acreages of wheat would total 50.6 million acres, feed grains 87.0 
million acres, soybeans 33.1 million acres and cotton 14.7 million acres (Table 15). These 
are the levels at which acreage quotas would necessarily have to be set if production is to 
equal demand at the higher price levels. Two off-setting tendencies occur with the 
implementation of acreage quotas. One tendency is for the quantity demanded both for 
domestic use in livestock production and in the export market to decline. This tendency 
reduces acreage needed to supply total demand. But offsetting this trend is the fact that as 
acreage quotas are imposed, production tends to be forced out of its optimum location and 
this causes less productive land to be used in production. Generally this land has lower 
li90th Congress, 2nd Session. Senate BillS. 2973, Introduced February 15, 1968. 
1J These costs do not include any return to management or to land; in the small farm case, 
$.11 of each dollar of sales remains for this purpose while in the large farm case, $.41 of 
each dollar of sales is available for this purpose. 
ll Exports under this alternative were estimated as follows: wheat, 750 million bushels; feed 
grains, 24.0 million tons; soybeans, 400 million bushels; and cotton, 5.0 million bales. 
-54-
Table ...!1: Projected 1970 harvested acreages, yields and production of major crops for a 
farm economy with rigid acreage quotas, with prior years for comparison. 
ACI:U:AL~ fROJECTED 
Crop 1961-65 1966 1967 1970 
Average 
HARVESTED ACREAGES (000) 
Wheat 48,017 49,867 59,004 50,602 
Feed Grains 101,086 97,812 100,654 87,009 
Corn 56,658 56,933 60,385 51,861 
Oats 21,162 17,861 15,970 15,794 
Barley 11,135 10,205 9,188 8,874 
Gr. Sorg. 12,131 12,813 15,111 10,480 
Soybeans 29,694 36,546 39,742 33,148 
Cotton 14,617 9,552 8,090 14,712 
YIELD PER HARVESTED ACRE 
Wheat (bu.) 25.3 26.3 25.8 29.1 
Corn (bu.) 66.3 72.3 78.2 82.8 
Oats (bu.) 45.2 44.9 49.0 48.8 
Barley (bu.) 36.2 38.5 40.3 41.0 
Gr. Sorg. (bu.) 45.0 55.8 50.7 59.3 
Soybeans (bu.) 24.2 25.4 24.5 26.8 
Cotton (lbs.) 491 480 452 493 
Wheat (bu.) 1,214,024 1,311,702 1,524,349 1,471,961 
Feed Grains (ton) 145,383 157,563 175,054 158,684 
Corn (bu.) 3,758,389 4,117,355 4,722,164 4,292,911 
Oats (bu.) 953,426 801,327 781,867 771,467 
Barley (bu.) 398,268 393,186 370,246 363,529 
Gr. Sorg. 547,676 714,992 765,617 621,950 
Soybeans (bu.) 718,687 928,481 972,701 888,291 
Cotton (bales) 14,935 9,575 7,618 14,500 
~ Actual production data are from Crop Production 1967 Annual Summary. 
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yields. Lower yields create a tendency for more acres to be used to produce the quantity of 
grains demanded. Thus, acreages decrease because a smaller quantity is demanded but some 
of the decline in acreage is offset by a decline in average yields. In the course of these shifts, 
some inefficiency would be created when production was forced from cropland in regions 
with a comparative advantage into regions of lower productivity. 
With production of both crops and livestock reduced, prices received by farmers 
increase. Wheat price rises to $1.56 and corn to $1.39 (Table 16). There are equilibrium 
prices in the sense that quotas restrain production in regions which could produce at a lower 
cost. (While these are the prices used for the analysis of "bargaining power," they also could 
be attained by the programs analyzed earlier if acreage reduction or land retirement was 
extended to a sufficiently high level.) With higher levels of prices for major grain and oilseed 
crops, livestock prices are also higher. Cattle and calves average $27.00 per hundred weight, 
hogs $22.00, and sheep and lambs $20.50 per hundredweight. Quantities of livestock 
required would be somewhat smaller, but the increase in prices would more than offset the 
loss in sales. 
Higher prices cause cash receipts from crops to increase over recent levels (Table 
17). Crop receipts total $19.0 billion, which is above even the 1966 receipts, a recent high. 
Livestock receipts, while not exceeding 1966, would be above other recent years, totaling 
$24.4 billion. Direct government payments would drop with the removal of programs to 
retire cropland. Payments remaining under the Sugar Act, Wool Act and conservation 
programs would total $326 million. Total cash receipts add up to $43.7 billion. 
Most cash farm expenses under this type program are higher compared to other 
alternative programs. Costs of feed purchased rise along with the cost of livestock 
purchased. Both these expenses are a function of price levels received by farmers. The 
increase in prices paid is somewhat offset by smaller quantities purchased, but higher prices 
received by farmers result in the higher expenses for these particular purchased inputs. Net 
cash receipts-total cash receipts less cash expenses-total $15.9 billion. Subtracting 
depreciation expense and adding in farm perquisites and changes in the value of farm 
inventories results in a net farm income of $14.1 billion dollars. 
The projected level of net farm income for this alternative is in-between estimates 
for other farm programs. The results suggest that increases in farm prices would not offset 
the multibillion dollar drop in government payments which would result from termination 
of major government programs for agriculture. Even though increases in prices cause total 
cash receipts from both crops and livestock to approach ·recent highs, decreases in 
government payments as well as higher expenses associated with this production cause net 
farm income to be lower. 
These results raise the question of whether farm commodity prices can be raised 
high enough through the means examined to offset decreases in cash receipts from 
government payments. Obviously, if prices could be raised high enough, the increase in cash 
receipts so resulting would more than cover the cessation of government payments. 
However, raising farm prices very far above present levels poses several problems. One is a 
market obstacle. Purchases, both in the domestic market and particularly in the export 
market, will decline as prices rise. Concurrently, a reduction in the quantity produced will 
be necessary to maintain the higher price level. But producers, realizing increased returns 
from the higher prices, will want to increase production-not decrease-at the same time that 
quantities demanded and utilized are to be reduced. The underlying forces of impalance 
could become even greater than at present and could cause the control of production to 
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Table 16. Projected 1970 farm level prices for major crops with strict acreage quotas and 
farm bargaining committees. Prior years are for comparison. 
ACTUAL PRICES RECEIVED.W PROJECTED 
Commodity Unit 1961-65 1965 1967 1970 
Average 
CROP PRICES 
Wheat bu. 1.67 1.35 1.39 1.56 
Corn bu. 1.13 1.16 1.05 1.39 
Oats bu. .63 .62 .66 .76 
Barley bu. .95 1.02 1.00 1.13 
Gr. Sorg. bu. 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.19 
Soybeans bu. 2.46 2.54 2.49 2.49 
Cotton Lint lb. 30.9 28.1 25.6 25.4 
LIVESTOCK PRICES 
Cattle lb. 19.8 20.0 22.6 27.0 
Hogs lb. 16.6 20.6 18.9 22.0 
Sheep lb. 16.8 20.0 18.9 20.5 
Broilers lb. 14.6 15.0 13.3 15.3 
Turkeys lb. 21.2 22.2 19.5 22.5 
Eggs doz. 37.1 33.7 31.2 35.4 
Milk cwt. 4.16 4.23 5.02 4.52 
!!I Actual prices received are from Agricultural Prices 1967 Annual Summary June 1968, 
and Livestock and Meat Statistics Supplement for 1967 to Statistical Bulletin No. 233. 
June 1968. 
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Table 17. Fann income by source, fann production expenses and net fann income, actual 1960-1967 
with projected 1970 estimates with acreage quotas under a system of fann bargaining 
committees. 
Source ACTUAL!!! PROJECTED 
of 1961-65 1965 1967 1970 
Income Average 
(million dollars) 
Crop Receipts 16,701 17,392 18,383 19,011 
Wheat 1,938 1,637 2,066 1,985 
Feed Grains 2,796 3,125 3,728 3,958 
Soybeans 1,636 1,812 2,432 2,069 
Cotton 2,545 2,065 947 2,036 
Tobacco 1,303 1,186 1,392 1,270 
Vegetables 2,158 2,559 2,616 2,697 
Fruits 1,614 1,667 1,746 1,686 
Other 2,711 3,478 3,456 3,310 
Livestock Receipts 20,041 21,958 24,405 24,386 
Meat Animals 11,472 12,964 14,630 13,922 
Dairy Products 4,126 5,037 5,770 5,512 
Poultry & Eggs 3,332 3,513 3,559 4,627 
Other 311 444 446 325 
Govt. Payments 1,905 2,463 3,079 326 
Wheat Program 295 525 731 0 
Feed Grains 1,0~~ 1,391 865 0 Cotton 70 932 0 
Other 585 477 551 326 
Total Cash Receipts 38,807 41,813 45,867 43,723 
Cash Expenses£/ 24,533 25,951 29,079 27,783 
Net Cash Receipts 14,274 15,862 16,788 15,CiJ40 
Depreciation 4,537 4,982 5,741 5,500 
Actual Cash Income 9,737 10,880 11,047 10,440 
Fann Perquisites~ 3,168 3,113 3,194 3,350 
Inventory Change 353 994 403 350 
Net Fann Income 13,249 14,987 14,644 14,140 
~ Actual income data are from Fann Income State Estimates 1949-64, A supplement to the 
July 1967 Fann Income Situation, August 1967; and Fann Income Situation, July 1968. 
lllt964-65 ave. 
9 Current operating expenses plus taxes, interest, and landlord rent. 
QJ Value of home consumption and gross rental value of farm dwelling. 
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become increasingly difficult. To maintain higher prices, controls on production would 
necessarily have to be tightened beyond those established and used for current voluntary 
programs. Obviously, they would have to be mandatory if the bargaining power route is to 
work. 
One means of holding higher prices would be for the government to continue its 
storage program, raise the price floor, and then purchase that quantity of grain necessary to 
maintain this price in the market place. Of course, for this procedure to work without a 
sharp increase in stocks or a sharp drop in exports, the government would have to supply 
grain for export at world market prices. Assuming that domestic prices rose above present 
levels, the lower export price would result in the government subsidizing the export of grain. 
This same process used in the 1950's caused considerable consternation in international 
circles. Eventually the United States changed its farm programs, price support levels and 
finally switched to direct government payments as a means to lessen output, raise prices and 
support farm income. The use of high price supports and heavily subsidized exports or a 
rapid buildup of domestic stocks may not be practical options for the future, not necessarily 
because farmers are unsatisfied with these programs, but due mainly to international policy 
considerations and the unwillingness of the public to bear large storage costs. It seems 
unlikely that these means of raising farm prices will be available to farmers in the near 
future unless we choose to ignore the export market which, as we pointed out earlier, now 
accounts for approximately 20 percent of all farm production. 
What, then, is the outlook for farmer bargaining power as the sole means for 
increasing prices and income? First, it is evident that this means can be effective only if 
mandatory acreage or marketing quotas are imposed. Used alone, price increases resulting 
from bargaining power imposed marketing reductions would be offset, over a considerable 
range of increase, by cessation of direct government payments under present voluntary 
control programs. Obviously, a further increment in prices, and a further reduction in 
output, would be necessary to offset the loss of income from government payments. But the 
question reamins: How far could prices be raised against restraints in export demand and 
farmer willingness to accept self-imposed production restraints if the government were not 
engaged in commodity storage, export subsidies and payments for reducing acreage and 
production? The answer to this question is crucial and poses the possibility that farmer 
bargaining power can not function effectively for the large complex of agriculture 
represented by feed grains and livestock apart from government programs and monetary 
participation. 
ALTERNATIVES IN TIME, COSTS AND ADJUSTMENT 
Several specific program alternatives have been analyzed. Many more could be 
examined. However, those investigated are one which have received special attention or 
discussion recently. 
Any one of the alternative government programs analyzed above could be used to 
attain higher prices and incomes than those projected. In each case, the amount of land 
removed from production would have to be greater than the amounts indicated above. For 
this reason, the costs of each program involving government costs also would be higher, but 
the relative position of each program with respect to government costs would be 
maintained. In the case of bargaining power without government payments, self-imposed 
restrictions on land use and production would need to be stricter to attain higher prices and 
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incomes. Of course, any substantial upward alteration in domestic price levels would reduce 
the prospects for commercial exports. Hence, production would have to be reduced further, 
or the government would have to invest further in storage and international food aid. 
It also should be recognized that none of the above programs which are designed 
to restrict output and attain higher commodity prices would solve the problems of farms 
and rural communities which revolve around structural transformation of agriculture due to 
the stage of economic development, relative prices of resources and the new capital 
technologies being applied by farmers. This structural transformation which brings a greater 
use of capital equipment, larger farms and the replacement of labor will continue under any 
of these program alternatives, just as it has been proceeding under the programs of the last 
decade. It is, indeed, time that programs include elements to alleviate the sacrifices falling 
on many farm families, laborers and rural communities as a result of this transformation 
process. It is necessary, for programs which will help alleviate these costs which fall on 
particular rural communities and farm families, that proper emphasis be given to retraining, 
job placements, vocational training, community planning and guidance, and investment 
generally in economic opportunity and public services. 
Also, it is possible in actual policy formulation to combine aspects of various of 
the programs analyzed in previous sections. One possibility would be emphasis on long-term 
land retirement, supplemented by programs to alleviate broad adjustment problems of the 
rural community, as the main means of bringing agriculture into a self-sustaining balance 
with respect to market supplies and demand. Combined with this main program could be a 
smaller program fashioned after current wheat and feed grain programs to handle variability 
in production and export demand due to weather and climate or other emergency and 
unforeseen contingencies. However, a storage program properly designed for purposes of 
stability in market supplies and prices, involving either purchases or sales from government 
stocks at appropriate times and prices, also could serve the latter purposes. The actual 
combination of programs to be adopted is left to the arena of the policy makers. But this 
analysis clearly points out that a shift to programs with a set of goals revolving around 
long-term resource adjustment is necessary to meet the need of a society living in a very 
advanced industrial and technological environment. 
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